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TERRITORIAL COURTS AND LAW*
UNIFYING FACTORS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS

William Wirt Blume**
Part

I.

and

Elizabeth Gaspar Brownt

ESTABLISHMENT OF A STANDARDIZED JUDICIAL SYSTEM

T

HE United States first became a sovereign nation when individual states of the Confederation ceded to the states collectively
their several interests in the lands west of the Appalachians which
lay east of the Mississippi, north of Spanish Florida, and south of
the Great Lakes. This area had been relinquished by Great Britain by the Treaty of 1783 and, with the exception of Kentucky,
now became the property of the United States. It was the first area
over which the states as a group had complete sovereignty, subject
only to the claims of the various Indian tribes. Colonies fresh from
success in a fight for freedom from colonialism thus soon found
themselves a colonial power faced with the task of governing their
own colonies.
The first plan of government for the western area was drafted
by Thomas Jefferson, and submitted to Congress on March l,
1784.1 Under this plan the entire western territory was to be

• Editor's Note.-For many years Professor William Wirt Blume has been engaged
in a continuing study of a large collection of territorial court records deposited in the
University of Michigan Law Library by the Michigan Historical Commission. A major
product of this study was the publication of Transactions of the Supreme Court of the
Territory of Michigan 1805-1836 (six volumes). In recent years five articles dealing
with the development of territorial law have been published in this Review under
titles referring generally to the legal history of the American frontier. In the course
of his research and writing, Professor Blume has formed some tentative conclusions as
to how American legal history may be approached. He has concluded that, following
separate studies of the original colonies, a study of the laws and legal institutions of
the territories as a group will serve to provide and be indicative of the feasibility of a
unified approach to legal developments west of the original states. To demonstrate
such an approach, Professor Blume, assisted by Research Associate Elizabeth Gaspar
Brown, has written this two-part article, which includes: Part I. Establishment of a
Standardized Judicial System, and Part II. Influences Tending To Unify Territorial Law.
The first part of this two-part article is printed herewith. The second will appear in a
subsequent issue of the Review.
•• Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
t Research Associate in Law, University of Michigan Law School.-Ed.
1 26 JOURNALS OF nu: CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 118 (Hunt ed. 1928). The plan was
submitted by a committee composed of Thomas Jefferson of Virginia, Jeremiah Townley
Chase of Maryland, and David Howell of Rhode Island. The committee report was in
Jefferson's handwriting. 3 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 408 (Ford ed. 1892). It is
referred to as "his report." 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 581 (Boyd ed. 1950).
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divided into fourteen states.2 For purposes of temporary government, the "free males of full age" within each of these states were
to "adopt the constitution and laws" of some one of the original
states, which would continue in force until the state should acquire
20,000 free inhabitants, when they might establish "a permanent
constitution and government for themselves." There would be
no colonial governments, only temporary ·state governments followed by permanent state governments. 3 But upon consideration
by Congress, it became evident that some form of colonial government would have to precede the temporary state governments provided for in the plan,4 and on April 21, 1784, the following amendment was proposed:
"That till such time as the settlers aforesaid shall have
adopted the constitution and laws of some one of the Original
states as aforesaid, for a temporary government, the said
settlers shall be ruled by magistrates to be appointed by the
United States in Congress assembled, and under such laws and
regulations as the United States in Congress assembled shall
direct.'' 5
Six of the eleven states voting on the motion favored its adoption,
as did nineteen of the twenty-four individual delegates present and
voting. Only one state voted "no," yet the motion was defeated.
And it is of interest to note that the Virginia delegation, including
Mr. Jefferson, voted "ay."
Then, on April 23, 1784, another amendment was proposed:
"That measures not inconsistent with the principles of the
Confederation, and necessary for the preservation of peace
2 See Jefferson-Hartley map in The William L. Clements Library, University of
Michigan, reproduced in "Th. Jefferson," a pamphlet published by the Library in 1943.
See also 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, op. cit. supra note l, at 592-93.
3 In earlier drafts Jefferson had sketched the bounds of a "new" Northwest "colony"
and of six "new" Northwest "Colonies." 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 600·01. In the plan submitted to Congress the term "colony" was not
used.
4 A revised report submitted to Congress, March 22, 1784, referred not merely to
"territory ceded or to be ceded by individual states to the United States," but to so
much thereof "as is already purchased or shall be purchased of the Indian inhabitants
&: offered for sale by Congress. • • ." Instead of authorizing settlers "within any of
the said states" to adopt a constitution, the revised plan gave this privilege to "settlers
of any territory so purchased and offered for sale.'' 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 607; 3 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, op. cit. supra note I, at
429.
5 26 JOURNALS OF THE CG>NTINENTAL CONGRESS 259 (Hunt ed. 1928). See also id. at 274.
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and good order among the settlers of any of the new states,
until they shall assume a temporary government as aforesaid,
may from time to time, be taken by the United States in Congress assembled." 6
A motion to postpone consideration of this proposal in order to
take up the amendment of April 21 was voted down. In this instance the Virginia delegation, including Mr. Jefferson, voted "no."
It has been suggested that Jefferson voted for the amendment
proposed April 21 "possibly because he knew it would be defeated."7 Why he would do this is not suggested. That he preferred
the language of April 23 to that of April 21 seems clear from his
second vote, but it also seems clear that he recognized on April 21
as well as on April 23 that some form of colonial rule would have
to precede self-rule. Failure to refer to the Ordinance of 1784 in
"his memoranda of the services which he took pride in having
rendered his country, written in 1800" and in "his autobiography,
written in 182 l " 8 may be explained by the fact that his original
plan was in fact unworkable and required amending. Even as
amended, it "bore no fruit" 11 and was repealed in 1787.
A new plan of a temporary government "for such districts as
shall be laid out by the United States" was submitted to Congress
May IO, 1786.10 This provided for the appointment by Congress
of a governor, five councillors, a secretary, and "a court, to consist of five members who shall have a common law and chancery
jurisdiction, and whose commissions shall continue in force during
good behavior." The draft recited that its object was to protect the
persons and rights of those who might settle within such districts
"in the infancy of their settlement"; that the United States looked
forward "with equal anxiety" to the period at which temporary
government should cease, and the settlers would be admitted "into
the Confederacy" agreeably to the acts of cession.
A revised plan submitted to Congress on July 13, 1786,11 omitted the provision for councillors but retained that calling for the
appointment of a court, changing "members" to "judges." The
a Id. at 274.
7 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 612 n.26.
8 3 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 429 n.1.
o LAws OF TIIE NORTHWEST TERlllTOllY 1788-1800, at xiii (Pease ed. 1925) [herein•
after cited as P.1!:ASEJ.
10 30 JOURNALS OF TIIE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 252 (Fitzpatrick ed. 1934).
11 Id. at 403.
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.provision for a court remained unchanged in the plan submitted
September 19, 1786,12 but in the bill of April 26, 1787, as amended
and ordered to a third reading on May 10, 1787, the provision
read: 13 "There shall also be appointed a Court, to consist of three
judges, any two of whom shall form a Court, who shall have a common law jurisdiction, whose commissions shall continue in force
during good behavior." This amended provision appears in the
Northwest Ordinance of July 13, 1787,14 accompanied by requirements that the judges "reside in the district and have each therein
a freehold estate in five hundred acres of land while in the exercise
of their offices."
Under the plan as amended on April 26, I 787,15 the three
judges, in addition to forming a court, were to join with the governor in adopting such laws of the original states as might be "necessary and best suited to the circumstances of the district." In
effect, as proposed by the amendment offered on April 21, 1784,16
the settlers were to be "ruled by magistrates to be appointed by the
United States in Congress assembled, and under such laws and
regulations as the United States in Congress assembled shall direct."
It should be noted, however, that this extreme form of colonial
government was to be modified as soon as there should be five
thousand "free male inhabitants, of full age" within the district,
at which time the settlers might elect representatives to a general
assembly. The second stage of colonial government was to end in
statehood when any of the states should have "of free inhabitants
as many as are equal in number to the one-thirteenth part of the
citizens of the original states." The same two stages of colonial
government were provided by the Northwest Ordinance of July
13, 1787, the second stage to end when any of the proposed states
should have sixty thousand "free inhabitants therein."
LEGISLATIVE AGENCIES AND POWER

Before examining some of the statutes which developed and
established the territorial court system, it may be useful to have
12 31 id. at 670.
13 2 THE ST. CLAIR

PAPERS

608 (Smith ed. 1882) [hereinafter cited as ST. CLAIR

PA·

PERS].

14 Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 51 n.(a); 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF
ed. 1934) [hereinafter cited as TERRITORIAL PAPERS].
n.15.

UNITED STATES 39, 41-42 (Carter
15 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 43
16 See note 5 supra.

TIIE
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a quick look at the legislative agencies employed. First, and foremost, was Congress, which had power to make all laws necessary for
territorial government. Congress did not, however, undertake to
serve as the sole or principal legislative agency, except for Alaska
1867-1912; Indian Territory 1889-1907; and the Canal Zone 1912-.
Instead, it enacted a "charter" for each territory, and passed occasional statutes to regulate the affairs of a particular territory, or
of all the territories as a group. General power to legislate was
delegated to the following agencies:
I. Governor and judges. Northwest 1787-1798; Southwest 17901794; Mississippi 1798-1800; Indiana 1800-1804; Louisiana (north
of Orleans) 1804-1812; Michigan 1805-1823; Illinois 1809-1812;
Arkansas 1819.
2. Governor and council. Orleans 1804-1805; Florida 18221845; Michigan 1823-1836.
3. Legislature (governor, council, and representatives). Northwest 1799-1802; Southwest 1794-1796; Mississippi 1800-1817; Indiana 1804-1816; Orleans 1805-1812; Missouri 1812-1821; Illinois
1812-1818; Alabama 1817-1819; Arkansas 1819-1836.
4. Governor and legislature (council and representatives). Wisconsin 1836-1848; Iowa 1838-1846; Minnesota 1849-1858; New
Mexico 1850-1912; Utah 1850-1896; Kansas 1854-1861; Nebraska
1854-1867; Colorado 1861-1876; Nevada 1861-1864; Dakota 18611889; Idaho 1863-1890; Montana 1864-1889; Wyoming 1868-1890;
Oklahoma 1890-1907.
5. Legislature (council or senate and representatives). Oregon
1848-1859; Washington 1853-1889; Arizona 1863-1912; Alaska
1912-1959; Puerto Rico 1900-1952; Hawaii 1900-1959; Philippines
1902-1935.
6. Legislature (one house). Guam 1950-; Virgin Islands 1954-.
The governor and judges were empowered to adopt "such laws
of the original States, criminal and civil, as might be necessary, and
best suited to the circumstances of the district.... " 17 Assemblies organized under the provisions of the Northwest Ordinance were
authorized "to make laws in all cases for the good government of
the district, not repugnant to the principles and Articles of this
Ordinance." The legislative power of Orleans extended "to all the
rightful subjects of legislation; but no law shall be valid which
17

Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 51 n.(a).
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is inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United
States . . . . " 18 "Provisions" of the Revised Statutes of 1873-74
"Common to all Territories" included:
"Sec. 1851. The legislative power of every Territory shall
extend to all rightJul subjects of legislation not inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States. But no
law shall be passed interfering with the primary disposal of
the soil; no tax shall be imposed upon the property of the
United States; nor shall the lands or other property of nonresidents be taxed higher than the lands or other property
of residents."
The judges, appointed by the national government, served as
legislators only briefly, but serving, as they did, at the beginning of
territorial government, they had a controlling voice in shaping
the earliest judicial systems.
The governor, also an appointee of the national government,
was a member of the legislative board during the periods of legislation by governor and judges, and was a "division" of most of the
later legislatures. At first no law was valid without the governor's
approval, but this requirement was gradually changed to permit
passage of a law over his veto by a two-thirds vote. That this was
true of all territories on December I, 1873, is shown by section
1842 of the Revised Statutes of 1873-74. But in 1875 Congress
added this proviso:
"That so much of this section as provides for making any
bill passed by the legislative assembly of a Territory a law,
without the approval of the governor, shall not apply to the
Territories of Utah and Arizona." 19
Members of the legislative councils were at first appointed by
the national government, usually from panels submitted by the
elected representatives (Northwest 1799-1892, Southwest I 7941796, Mississippi 1800-1817, Indiana 1800-1809, Orleans 18041812, Michigan 1823-1827, Illinois 1809-1812, Missouri 1812-1816,
Alabama 1817-1819, Florida 1822-1826); later, they were elected
by popular vote.
Final control over territorial legislation remained with Congress, which reserved the power to annul any law that might be
18
19

Orleans Organic Act of 1804, ch. 38, § 4, 2 Stat. 284.
Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 80, 18 Stat. 318.
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passed. The territories were permitted to send a delegate to Congress, but he had no vote.
The preceding sketch, coupled with the fact that before 1839
the territorial governor-an appointee of the national government
-appointed all local judicial officers, indicates the measure of
self-government allowed under the colonial system of the United
States.
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS BEFORE 1836
The following outline of the judicial systems of the twelve
territories organized before 1836 is limited to acts of Congress.
I.

COURTS

Northwest (1787-1802)
•Court (supreme-general-superior)
Three judges, any two to form a court (1787); one to hold
court in absence of others (1792)
t Probate (1787)
t Magistrate (1787)
•Federal (District of Ohio) 1801-1802
Southwest (1790-1796)
•Same as Northwest (1790)
One judge to hold court in absence of others (1792)
Mississippi (1798-1817)
•Same as Northwest (1798)
• Additional judge (1804)
•Additional judge (1810)
•Additional judge (1817)
•General court
To be held at future seat of Alabama government by the
three additional judges or any two (1817)
Indiana (1800-1817)
•Same as Northwest (1800)
At least two judges to compose court (1815)
•Federal (District of Ohio) 1801-1802
Orleans (1804-1812)
•superior court
Three judges, one to constitute a court (1804)
•District Court (federal)
One judge (1804)
tinferior courts (1804-)
tJustices of the peace (1804-)
Louisiana (north of Orleans) (1804--1812)
•Judges of Indiana
All or any two to hold a court (1804-)
•court (supreme-general-superior)
Three judges, all or any two to hold a court (1805)
• Established by Congress.
Expressly authorized or referred to by Congress.

t
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Michigan (1805-1836)
*Same as Northwest (1805)
• Additional judge (1823)
tCourts for eastern counties
One or more judges of Supreme Court (1827)
Illinois (1809-1818)
*Same as Northwest (1809)
*Court of appeals
Three judges, or a majority of them (1815)
*Circuit courts (three)
Each to be held by one judge (1815)
tinferior courts (1815)
tCourt of oyer and terminer (1816)
Missouri (1812-1821)
*Superior court
Three judges, any two to constitute a court (1812)
tinferior courts (1812)
·
tJustices of the peace (1812)
• Additional judge (1814)
tCircuit courts
Judges of superior court (1816)
Alabama (1817-1819)
*Same as Mississippi (1817)
Arkansas (1819-1836)
*Superior court
Three judges, any two for appellate, any _one for original
jurisdiction (1819)
tinferior courts (1819)
tJustices of the peace (1819)
*Superior court
Four judges, any two other than trial judge to hear appeals
· (1828)
tCircuit or district courts (four)
Each to be held by one judge of superior court (1828)
Florida (1822-1845)
*Superior courts (two)
Each to be held by one judge (1822; 1823)
tinferior courts (1822; 1823)
tJustices of the peace (1822; 1823)
*Superior courts (three)
Each to be held by one judge (1824)
*Court of appeals
Judges of superior courts, any two a quorum (1824)
United States Supreme Court
Writs of error to, and/or appeals from
Superior territorial courts in federal-type cases concerning
the United States (1805)
Highest tribunal of Michigan in cases exceeding $1000 (1825)
• Established by Congress.
Expressly authorized or referred to by Congress.

t
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General court of Alabama in admiralty and maritime cases
(1818)
Arkansas superior court in certain land cases (1824); in cases
exceeding $1000 (1828); to review law and fact in certain
cases (1830)
Superior courts and court of appeals of Florida in both
territorial and federal-type cases (1822; 1823; 1824; 1826;
1828; 1832)

2.

JUDGES

Appointment
By United States in Congress assembled
Northwest (1787)
By President of United States with advice and consent of Senate
Northwest (1789)
All territories
Number
See COURTS supra.
Tenure:

Good Behavior
Northwest (1787)
Southwest (1790)
Mississippi (1798)
Indiana (1800)
Michigan (1805)
Illinois (1809)
Alabama (1817)

Four years
Orleans
Superior (1804)
District (federal)
Louisiana (north of
Orleans) (1805)
Michigan (1824)
Missouri (1812)
Arkansas (1819)
Florida (1822; 1823)

Qualifications
None prescribed
Residence
Must reside in territory or district
All territories (1812)
Property
Must own specified property while in office
Northwest (1787)
All territories having courts same as Northwest
Not to practice law
All territories (1812)
3. CLERKS
Appointment by court
Orleans (1804)
Missouri (1812; 1814)
Michigan (1827)
Arkansas (1828)
Florida (1822; 1823)
Illinois (1815)
Residence, duties, fees, etc.
Same territories
4. UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
Appointment
By President of United States with advice and consent of Senate
Number
One for Orleans (federal) district (1804)
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One for each territory (1813)
One for each Florida district (1822; 1823; 1824; 1828)
Qualifications
Learned in the law
5. UNITED STATES MARSHAL
Appointment and number
Same as UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, supra
6. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE
Appointment
By governor
All territories (except Arkansas and Florida after 1829)
By legislature
Arkansas and Florida (1829)
Election by electors not authorized
Michigan (1825)
Arkansas (1829)
Florida (1829)
Term of office--four years
Orleans (1804)
Missouri (1812)
Florida (1822; 1823)

7.

JURORS

Qualifications prescribed
Orleans (1804)
Missouri (1812)
Florida (1822; 1823)
8. EXTENT OF JUDICIAL POWER
Common-law jurisdiction
Northwest (1787)
All territories having courts same as Northwest
Florida (1826)
Chancery jurisdiction
Indiana (1816)
Michigan (1823)
Illinois (1815)
Missouri (1816)
Florida (1826)
Criminal and civil cases
Orleans (1804)
Missouri (1812)
Arkansas (1819)
Florida (1822; 1823; 1824)
Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
Alabama (1818)
Florida (1826)
Same as federal (Kentucky District)
Orleans district court (federal) (1804)
Superior courts of all territories not having a district court in
cases concerning the United States (1805)
Superior courts of Florida in cases arising under federal law
(1822; 1823; 1824)
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As shown by the above outline, Congress established at least
one superior court in each territory, and, either expressly or impliedly, authorized the territorial legislatures to establish others.
Regulation of when, where, and how the courts were to exercise
their respective jurisdictions was left in large measure to the local
legislatures, "even to the defining of the jurisdiction of the several
courts.''20
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS AFTER 1836

The following "Provisions" of the Revised Statutes of 1873-74
"Common to all the Territories" show that by 1873 a single judicial system had been developed:
"Sec. 1864. The supreme court of every Territory shall
consist of a chief justice and two associate justices, any two
of whom shall constitute a quorum ....
"Sec. 1865. Every Territory shall be divided into three
judicial districts; and a district court shall be held in each
district of the Territory by one of the justices of the supreme
court ....
"Sec. 1867. No justices of the peace in any Territory shall
have jurisidiction of any case in which the title to land, or the
boundary thereof, in anywise comes in question.
"Sec. 1868. The supreme court and the district courts, respectively, of every Territory, shall possess chancery as well
as common law jurisdiction.
"Sec. 1869. Writs of error, bills of exception, and appeals
shall be allowed, in all cases, from the final decisions of the district courts to the supreme court of all the Territories ....
"Sec. 1870. The supreme court of each Territory shall
appoint its own clerk ....
"Sec. 1871. Each judge of the supreme court of the respective Territories shall designate and appoint one person as
clerk of the district court over which he presides ....
"Sec. 1872. Every district clerk shall be also the register
in chancery ....
"Sec. 1875. There shall be appointed in each Territory a
person learned in the law, to act as attorney for the United
States....
"Sec. 1876. There shall be appointed a marshal for each
Territory. He shall execute all process issuing from the terri20 Justice Bradley in Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 648, 655 (1874).
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torial courts when exercising their jurisdiction as circuit and
district courts of the United States...."
"Provisions concerning particular Organized Territories" indicate lack of uniformity in only a few features of the system. For
example:
"Sec. 1907. The judicial power in New Mexico, Utah,
Washington, Colorado, Dakota, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, shall be vested in a supreme court, district courts, probate courts, and in justices of the peace.
"Sec. 1908. The judicial power in Arizona shall be vested
in a supreme court and such inferior courts as the legislative
council may by law prescribe.
"Sec. 1909. Writs of error and appeals from the final decisions of the supreme court of either of the Territories of New
Mexico, Utah, Colorado, Dakota, Arizona, Idaho, Montana,
and Wyoming, shall be allowed to the Supreme Court of the
United States ... where ....
"Sec. 1910. Each of the district courts in the Territories
mentioned in the preceding section shall have and exercise
the same jurisdiction, in all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, as is vested in the circuit
and district courts of the United States....
"Sec. 1911. Writs of error and appeals from the final decisions of the supreme court of Washington Territory, shall be
allowed and may be taken to the Supreme Court of the United
States ... where ....
"Sec. 1912. The supreme and district courts of each Territory, and the respective judges thereof, except for Idaho and
Montana, may grant writs of habeas corpus in which the same
may be grantable by the judges of the United States in the
District of Columbia."
The standardized or established judicial system shown by the
above provisions was the end-product of a long period of experimentation commenced by the preliminary drafts of the Northwest
Ordinance prior to 1787, and carried forward by Congress and the
governments of the twelve territories organized before 1836. It was
first formulated in the Wisconsin Organic Act of 1836 which, according to Chief Justice Chase (1871),21 "seems to have received
full consideration, and from which all subsequent acts for the or21 Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 434, 444 (1871). Chief Justice Salmon P.
Chase edited the statutes of Ohio and of the Northwestern Territory in 1833, and was
an expert on territorial government.
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ganization of Territories have been copied, with few and inconsiderable variations."
When Iowa was created out of Wisconsin in 1838, the judicial
system provided by Congress was the same as that of Wisconsin except, instead of "during good behaviour," the superior judges were
to be appointed for four years, and each was to reside in the district
to which he should be assigned. In 1839 the Iowa legislature was
authorized to provide for the election of sheriffs, judges of probate,
and justices of the peace.22 The same authority was given the Wisconsin legislature in 1843.23 The Wisconsin system, as modified by
these changes, was the system first established in:
Oregon (1848)
Kansas (1854)
Idaho (1863)
Minnesota (1849)
Nebraska (1854)
Montana (1864)
New Mexico (1850)
Colorado (1861)
Wyoming (1868)
Utah (1850)
Nevada (1861)
Oklahoma (1890)
Washington (1853)
Dakota (1861)
The courts first provided for the following territories differed
from those of the standardized or established system in the respects
indicated: Arizona 1863 (supreme; inferior); Alaska 1884 (district;
commissioners); Indian 1889 (United States court); Hawaii 1900
(supreme; circuit; inferior, United States District Court); Puerto
Rico 1900 (courts established by military-supreme, municipal,
police; United States District Court); Philippines 1902 (courts established by commission-supreme, first instance, municipal);
Canal Zone 1912 (district; magistrates); Virgin Islands 1936 and
Guam 1950 (district court; courts established by law).
The standardized or established territorial judicial systemour third judicial system-differed significantly from both the
state judicial systems and the federal judicial system in that it
served all the purposes of state courts, and at the same time
handled all federal matters requiring judicial attention in the
territories.
JURISDICTION OF SUPERIOR COURTS

A. Common Law
The superior judges of Northwest, and of all territories established in the area east of the Mississippi relinquished by England
22 Act of March 3, 1839, ch. 92, 5 Stat. 357. See HAYNES, Selection and Tenure of
Judges, THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION IN AMERICA, 1830-1850, ch. IV (1944).
28 Act of March 3, 1843, ch. 99, 5 Stat. 630.
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in 1783, were vested by Congress with a "common law jurisdiction" to be exercised "according to the course of the common
law."24 The superior judges of Orleans (1804),25 Missouri (1812), 26
Arkansas (1819),27, and Florida (1822, 1823, 1824)28 were given
jurisdiction of "criminal cases" and "civil cases." These territories
were parts of the Louisiana and Florida purchases, and it was not
clear at the beginning whether the prior Spanish law or Englishtype law was to furnish the rule of decision.
A memorial to Congress submitted by the Indiana Legislature
in 1814 suggested the propriety of pointing out by law
" ... what common law the ordinance refers to, whether the
common law of England, of France, or of the Territory over
which the ordinance is the constitution. If it should be determined that, by the expression of the ordinance, a common
law jurisdiction should be located on the common law of
England, it is essential to define to what extent of that common law the judges shall take cognizance; whether the whole
extent of feudal and gothic customs of England; whether
the customs, or unwritten law shall be taken with the statute •
law, and that to form the common law to govern the judges;
or whether the unwritten and statute law is to be taken in
contradistinction to the laws, customs, and rules of chancery;
or whether it includes that law which is common to all.".211
The Indiana legislators had little or no reason to believe that the
term "common law" used in the Ordinance of 1787 referred to the
common law of France. The laws and customs of Canada, including the Custom of Paris, previously in force in the area under the
Quebec Act of 1774, had been recognized by the Ordinance, but
only to the extent of "saving" to the French and Canadian inhabitants of certain villages "their laws and customs now in force
among them relative to the descent & conveyance of property."
Reference to the legislative history of the Ordinance would have
shown that the term "common law" was used in contradistinction
to "chancery" and that both terms referred to jurisdiction of the
24 Art. II, Northwest Ordinance of 1787, l Stat. 51 n.(a).
25 Orleans Organic Act of 1804, ch. 38, § 5, 2 Stat. 284.
26 Act of June 4, 1812, ch. 95, § IO, 2 Stat. 746.
27 Act of March 2, 1819, ch. 49, § 7, 3 Stat. 495.
28 Act of March 30, 1822, ch. 13, § 6, 3 Stat. 656; Act of March 3, 1823, ch. 28, § 7,
3 Stat. 752; Act of May 26, 1824, ch. 163, 4 Stat. 45.
29 ANNALS OF CONG., 13th Cong., 3d Sess. 401 (1814).
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kind exercised by the central English courts. "Common law" without further specification was entirely too vague to serve as a guide
for deciding cases.
The Orleans Organic Act of 180430 made no reference to "common law," nor did the amended act of 180531 which put in force
some of the provisions of the Northwest Ordinance. Nevertheless,
lawyers newly settled in Orleans took the position. that by extending provisions of the Northwest Ordinance to the Territory,
Congress had substituted the English common law for the law previously in force. A contrary position was taken by Edward Livingston and local French lawyers, and the question was argued at
length in a test case. According to one of his biographers,32 Livingston argued that the words "common law" should be construed as
the "common law of Louisiana," and this position was in fact sustained by the court.33 An account of this case by "An Old Louisianian" will be found in The Courier (New Orleans) of January 15,
1824:
"Mr. Livingston had been hardly fifteen months in New
Orleans, when Congress were pleased to form Louisiana into
separate territories, and to give us, as a constitution, the ordinance of l 787, which had been framed for a country almost
desert to the northwest of the Ohio.•.. As if to crown the
work, that famous ordinance did contain a clause providing
that the Superior Court should exercise a jurisdiction of common law. What a resource did not those few words, apparently
so positive, offer to all the lawyers brought among us by the
taking of possession? ... If that clause was put in force, every
thing was at an end in our jurisprudence; our ancient laws
would have disappeared, and upon their venerable ruins
would have been erected a system which none of us was acquainted with, which nowhere exists in a body of law, and
which its warmest advocates themselves do hardly know....
So we did see pretended patriots, self-styled honest men, actuated by a disgusting cupidity, unite all their efforts and
their criminal boldness, and under the pretense of an exclu30 Ch. 38, 2 Stat. 283.
31 Act of March 2, 1805, ch. 24, 2 Stat. 323.
32 HATCHER, EDWARD LMNGSTON ll9 (1940).
88 HUNT, LIFE OF EDWARD LMNGSTON 117 (1864)

stated: "I have not found anything
that could be called a report of the argument he delivered on this occasion; but it
produced a profound impression."
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sive adherence to the letter of the paramount law, assert that
from thenceforth we should be governed by the Common
Law of England.-That great question was at length brought
before the Superior Court. Livingston, the courageous and
generous Livingston, entered alone the lists against them all .
. . . His generous exertions were crowned by the success most
glorious for him, the most happy for his new brethren the
Louisianians. The Superior Court declared itself in his favor,
and in so doing, freed us from that inextricable labyrinth of
incoherent decision, scattered in thousands of volumes, and
which people have been pleased to decorate with the pompous
name of Common law . ... " 34
Free to choose what law should govern the Territory, the legislature followed the precedent of the Quebec Act by continuing
the prior law for civil cases while adopting the English common
law for criminal cases. 35
Florida was given a similar choice, but instead of continuing
the Spanish law for civil cases, the legislative council declared in
1822 that "the common law of England" and certain English
statutes, together with American chancery practice, should be "the
rule of decision." 36 A year earlier Spanish criminal procedure had
been supplanted by proceedings "according to the course of the
common law."37 After these developments the civil jurisdiction of
the superior courts was described as being "in law and equity." 38
The same was true of Missouri and Arkansas after the Missouri
Legislature had made English law "the rule of decision." 39 In
Louisiana (north of Orleans) the judges had the same jurisdiction
as those of Indiana40-the common-law jurisdiction conferred by
the Northwest Ordinance.
B. Chancery
The earliest drafts of the Northwest Ordinance provided for
territorial judges who should have "a common law and chancery
34 Referred to by Brown,

l AM.

J.

Legal Systems in Conflict: Orleans Territory 1801-1812,

LEGAL HIST. 35, 38-40 (1957).
35 The 1805 statute which "introduced the common law in all criminal matters" is
quoted and interpreted in State v. McCoy, 8 Rob. 545 (La. 1844).
36 FLORIDA TERRITORY SESSIONS LAws (Sept. 2, 1822).
37 Ordinance of Maj. Gen. Jackson to Regulate Criminal Procedure, July 21, 1821,
reported in ORDINANCES OF THE PROVINCES OF THE FLORIDAS, BUT RELATING SPECIFICALLY TO
WEST FLORIDA, AS PROCLAIMED BY MAJOR GENERAL ANDREW JACKSON (McMurtrie ed. 1941).
38 Act of May 15, 1826, ch. 46, 4 Stat. 164.
39 Act of April 29, 1816, ch. 155, § 3, 3 Stat. 328.
40 Act of March 3, 1805, ch. 31, § 4, 2 Stat. 331.
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jurisdiction."41 Why the words "and chancery" were omitted from
the draft of May 10, 1787, and from the Ordinance, has not been
established, but it seems probable that the suggestion came from
the New England "adventurers" known as the Ohio Company who
were negotiating for the purchase of six or seven million acres of
the government's western land.42 The significance of the omission
was noted by St. Clair, governor of Northwest, in a letter to judges
Parsons and Varnum in 1788:
"As Judges, you are clothed with a common Law Jurisdiction, which is, at once, both descriptive & restrictive;-restrictive as to any Powers in Equity."48
Judges Parsons and Varnum were well-educated and experienced
New England lawyers fully familiar with the Massachusetts scheme
of administering equity through common law forms. The governor
was from Pennsylvania where a similar scheme was in operation.
As a member of Congress the governor knew the legislative history
of the Ordinance. Fully aware of the restriction implied by the
omission of the words "and chancery" the officers of Northwest at
no time attempted to confer on the superior court equity jurisdiction beyond that administered in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania
through common law forms.
In 1802 the justices of an Indiana court of common pleas presented to Congress a petition praying that the Northwest Ordinance "be so far revised and amended by law, as to give chancery
powers to the judges of the said Territory."44 Reporting to the
House of Representatives in 1803, a committee stated:
"The courts without equitable jurisdiction will inevitably, in some instances, become the instruments of iniquity,
instead of the administrators of justice. Fraud, accident, and
hardship, ingredients in many of those transactions of human
life, which constitute the basis of litigation; entrenched within legal forms and veiled with specious, but deceitful appearances, are many times not within the reach of a tribunal,
vested with common law powers only. To develop, and relieve against them, an equitable jurisdiction is necessary." 45
supra.
Some of the circumstances will be found in Blume, Chancery Practice on the
American Frontier, 59 MICH. L. REv. 49, 50-53 (1960).
43 2 Sr. CLAIR PAPERS 72, 76; 3 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 273, 277.
H ANNALS OF CONG., 7th Cong., 1st Sess. 1131 (1802).
<Its ANNALS OF CONG., 8th Cong., 2d Sess. 1577 (1803).
41 See notes 10-12
42
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Nothing resulting from the committee's recommendation that the
judges of Indiana and other territories be vested with "the powers
usually exercised by a court of equity," the Indiana legislature in
1805 established a separate "Court of Chancery."46 Writing in 1807
Governor Harrison of Indiana stated:
"If ever there was a country where a court of Chancery
was necessary, ours is the one; because in no other (as I believe)
has there ever been so much valuable property transferred
without the observance of the legal forms of conveyance, or
where the evasion of the specific performance of contracts
would produce so much confusion, injustice, and ruin." 47
In 1816 Congress removed the implied restriction by empowering
the "general court" to exercise "chancery powers as well as a common law jurisdiction."48 A year earlier similar powers had been
conferred on the superior judges of Illinois.49 The legislature of
Illinois had refused to continue the separate "Court of Chancery"
inherited from Indiana, 50 but had in 1812 attempted to establish a
"Court of Chancery" to be held by the judges of the General
Court. 51
The governor and judges of Michigan, presumably unaware of
the legislative history of the court provision of the Northwest Ordinance, provided in 1805 that the territorial supreme court
should have certain original jurisdiction "both in law and equity" ;52
and declared in 1812 that the court should have jurisdiction of "all
matters in equity." 53 "Rousseau," in the Detroit Gazette of December 5, 1817, complained:
"The ordinance ... declares 'There shall be appointed a
Court, to consist of three Judges, who shall have a common
law jurisdiction.' Is it not plain that no other but a common
law jurisdiction is granted? and that this jurisdiction can only
be enlarged by the same authority which granted it? . . . I
46 LA.ws OF INDIANA TERRITORY 1801-1809, at 108 (Philbrick ed. 1930) [hereinafter
cited as INDIANA LAws].
47 Id. at clxvii.
48 Act of April 29, 1816, ch. 154, § 6, 3 Stat. 327.
49 Act of March 3, 1815, ch. 98, § 5, 3 Stat. 237.
50 THE LA.ws OF lu.INoIS TERRITORY 1809-1818, at 5 (Philbrick ed. 1950) [hereinafter
cited as ILLINOIS LA.ws].
51 Id. at 52.
52 1 LAws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 9 (reprint 1871) [hereinafter cited as
MICHIGAN LA.ws].
53 Id. at 183. For text see 8 MICHIGAN PIONEER COLLECTIONS 617 (1907).
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therefore protest against the right of the legislative board ...
to vest this court with any powers at all. . .. But our Judges,
forsooth, not content with limited powers-powers adequate
to every useful purpose, usurp such as are not granted, erect
themselves by a law of their own passing into a Supreme
Court,-by another, giving themselves 'jurisdiction in all cases
of divorce and alimony' and by another 'of all matters in
equity.'"
William Woodbridge, Secretary of the Territory, wrote Solomon
Sibley, delegate to Congress, in 1820, that "Judge Griffin now
expresses doubts whether, without an act of Congress, the Supreme
Court can entertain jurisdiction of Chancery Cases.'' 54 In 1823
Congress provided that the judges of Michigan should possess "a
chancery, as well as common law, jurisdiction.''55
In Mississippi inability to nullify Spanish land grants, fraudulently dated so as to appear to precede the treaty between the
United States and Spain, led to demands for the establishment of
a court of chancery. According to a report made by Governor
Claiborne to Secretary Madison in 1801,56 oral testimony was admitted in an inferior court to invalidate a certain antedated grant,
but on appeal to the superior court this evidence was declared inadmissible. The governor stated that he was opposed to a change
in the law of evidence, and saw no remedy, "unless indeed, a Court
of Chancery would reach the case, and it seems to be the opinion
of most of the Lawyers here that it would not." In 1802 the local
legislature provided that each "superior court of law" should also
"be and act as a court of equity for the same district," final decrees
to be passed by at least two judges.57 The act further provided for
jury trial of issues of fact, the mode of proceeding to be the same
"in every respect, as in trials at law.'' In 1809 it was directed that
"circuit" court be called a "superior court of law and equity." 58
This scheme was inherited by Alabama in 1817.
M Sibley Papers, Burton Historical Collection, Public Library, Detroit, Michigan.
Judge Griffin was in Indiana serving as a territorial judge when the questioned chancery
jurisdiction for that territory was under consideration, and was familiar with the difficulties of interpretation encountered there.
55 Act of March 3, 1823, ch. 36, § 3, 3 Stat. 769.
56 1 MISSISSIPPI TERRITORIAL ARCHIVES 1798-1803, at 363 (Rowland ed. 1905).
57 Miss. Acts, 1st Gen. Ass., 1st &: 2d Sess. 186 (1802).
58 Miss. Acts, 6th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. 98 (1809). Details of this and other Mississippi
developments with texts of pertinent sessions laws will be found in Penzien, Court Or-
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In the territory south of the Ohio which became Tennessee in
1796, North Carolina statutes were continued in force including
an act "giving equity jurisdiction to the superior courts of law"
and an act "for better regulating the proceedings in courts of
equity.'' 59 At first the court conducted by the three judges appointed under acts of Congress and the "ordinance of the old congress" was known as a "superior court of law" ; 60 later it was called
a court of "law and equity.'' 61
In Orleans, as noted above, 62 the superior court's jurisdiction
was characterized as "criminal" and "civil" with no subdivision of
"civil" into "law" and "chancery.'' In Louisiana (north of Orleans)
the jurisdiction of the superior judges was "common law" 63 until
1810 when the local legislature conferred, or attempted to confer,
"a chancery jurisdiction.''64 This scheme was inherited by Missouri
and was continued by local legislation. 65 In 1816 Congress removed
any doubts by providing, as it had for Illinois and Indiana, that the
Missouri superior courts should "possess and exercise chancery
powers as well as common law jurisdiction in all civil cases.'' 66 Laws
in force in Missouri in 1819 were continued in force in Arkansas.
As to Florida, after the local legislature had made English law the
"rule of decision,"67 Congress provided (1826) that the superior
courts should "have and exercise original jurisdiction in all civil
causes, in law and equity.'' 68
Commencing in 1805 the superior courts of all the territories,
except Orleans with its separate federal court, had original jurisdiction of all suits in equity involving more than $500 brought by
the United States as plaintiff. 69
ganization in the Mississippi Territory, Jan. 1958 (unpublished thesis in University of
Michigan Law Library).
59 1 LAws OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE 1715-1820, at 457 (Scott's Revisals 1821) [hereinafter cited as TENNESSEE LAws].

Ibid.
Id. at 497.
62 See note 30 supra.
63 Act of March 3, 1805, ch. 31, § 4, 2 Stat. 331.
64 1 LAWS OF THE DISTRicr OF LOUISIANA, OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA, OF THE
TERRITORY OF MISSOURI, AND OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI UP TO THE YEAR 1824, at 240
(1842) [hereinafter cited as LAws OF LoUJSIANA AND MISSOURI].
65 Id. at 349, 445.
66 Act of April 29, 1816, ch. 155, § 3, 3 Stat. 328.
67 See note 36 supra.
68 Act of May 15, 1826, ch. 46, 4 Stat. 164.
69 Origin of this special federal-type jurisdiction will be noted under "Admiralty"
60
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Of the twelve territories organized before 1836, all except
Northwest and Orleans had superior courts with chancery as well
as common-law jurisdiction. In most of them chancery jurisdiction
was at first conferred locally, Congress acting later. In Northwest
equity was administered through common-law forms. In Orleans
equity administered by the superior court was the Roman-law
type, not the separate equity of English chancery. 70 The Orleans
district court had the same equity jurisdiction as other federal
courts. All superior courts of the sixteen territories having the
standardized or established judicial system, first formulated for
Wisconsin in 1836, possessed "chancery as well as common law
jurisdiction." This standardized expression reflects the fact that
chancery was an after-thought, something added to the original
grant.
C. Probate
Wills and conveyances of land made as prescribed by the Northwest Ordinance were to be effective "provided such wills be duly
proved and be recorded within one year after proper magistrates,
courts and registers shall be appointed for that purpose." Considering this a mandate to provide for the probate of wills, the
governor and judges of Northwest, as one of their earliest legislative acts (1788), authorized the appointment of a probate judge for
each county, and provided for probate courts to be held by the
probate judge assisted by two judges of the county court of common pleas.71 The court, as distinguished from the judge, was to
act whenever it was necessary "to render a definitive sentence, or
to render a final decree." In adopting this statute the judges rejected a recommendation of Governor St. Clair72 that the Pennsylvania probate system be adopted. Established in a territory which
had neither ecclesiastical courts nor courts of chancery, the Northwest probate courts had to exercise a combined jurisdiction similar
to that exercised by the probate courts of Massachusetts.
In 1795 the governor and judges of Northwest added an "orinfra. Consideration of whether it was necessary to administer law and equity separately
will be found under "Regulation of Superior Court Procedure.''
70 See Franklin, Equity in Louisiana: The Role of Article 21, 9 TuL. L. R.Ev. 485
(19!15).
71 PEASE 9; I STATUTES OF Omo AND OF THE NoRTHWESn:RN TERRITORY 96 (Chase ed.
18!1!1) [hereinafter cited as CHASE].
72 2 ST. CLAIR PAPERS 67; !I TERRITORIAL PAPERS 270.
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phans court" to be held by the justices of the county courts of
quarter sessions.73 This statute, copied from Pennsylvania, conferred a jurisdiction which overlapped that of the probate courts.74
It has been said that the Orphans Court of Pennsylvania "which
may be described in a general way as a court having control of
everything relating to decedents' estates, has always been, so far
as its jurisdiction extends, a court with full equity powers." 75 According to an Ohio judge, the Northwest orphans court had "peculiar facilities for acquiring correct information of the condition
of intestates' estates." 76
In Michigan Territory the governor and judges adopted in
1818 a complete probate code made up almost entirely of statutes
copied from Massachusetts.77 The Massachusetts probate courts,
in the absence of ecclesiastical and chancery courts, had exercised
in combination the separate powers of the ecclesiastical, chancery,
and common-law courts of England. 78 This was well suited to
Northwest but in Michigan, where a superior court exercising
full chancery jurisdiction was in operation, a question arose
whether this grant of combined jurisdiction to the inferior court
had the effect of limiting the chancery jurisdiction of the superior
court. Answering this question in 1829, Sibley, a judge of the territorial supreme court, stated:
"I am aware of the great inconvenience and hardship that
would be imposed on the Citizens of the Territory, to be
called before this Court, instead of the Courts of probate,
which are located in every County of the Territory, for the
settlement of decedents estates-And I am not, as at present
advised, prepared to sustain that broad proposition-I am inclined to the opinion, that our probate laws do restrain the
jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, and that it was the
1 CHASE 159; PEASE 181.
See letter from Governor St. Clair to justices of the Orphans Court of Hamilton
County (copy to probate judge) dated Sept. 8, 1796, comparing the two jurisdictions.
3 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 460.
75 Fisher, The Administration of Equity Through Common Law Forms, 1 L.Q. REY.
455, 461 (1885).
76 Lessee of Ludlow's Heirs v. McBride, 3 Ohio 241, 259 (1827).
77 For a list of these statutes, see Blume, Probate and Administration on the American Frontier, 58 MICH. L. R.Ev. 209, 242 (1959).
78 See Atkinson, The Development of the Massachusetts Probate System, 42 MICH.
L. REY. 425 (1943). For the English development, see Murphy, Early Forms of Probate
and Administration: Some Evidence Concerning Their Modern Significance. 3 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 125 (1959).
73

74
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evident intention of the Legislature that the Judge of probate
should have exclusive original jurisdiction, in cases made cognizable before him, wherein he is vested with sufficient powers
to give by his Decrees adequate relief." 79
In 1863 Justice Campbell of the state supreme court was "very
strongly inclined to the opinion that under our probate system
the Court of Chancery has only jurisdiction in those cases in which
an adequate remedy does not exist in the Probate Court."80 Similar views were expressed by Justice Gooley in 1871.
To the statement quoted above Sibley added:
"I am fortified in this opinion, by the provision of the
Law which gives an appeal from the decrees of the probate to
the Supreme Court, where his acts and proceedings may be
revised, and if found erroneous rectified." 81
Any lost original jurisdiction could be exercised on appeal. In
Northwest the superior court exercised this type of chancery jurisdiction only on appeal.
Summarizing the developments before 1836, we find that jurisdiction of probate and administration was vested in local courts
established by the territorial legislatures, and not in the superior
courts established by Congress, except for a brief period in Michigan.82 The superior courts did, however, serve as courts of probate
Abbott v. Abbott (1829), as reported in 5 TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1825-1836, at 375, 382 (Blume ed. 1940).
80 People v. Circuit Court for the County of Wayne, 11 Mich. 393, 403 (1863).
81 Holbrook v. Campau, 22 Mich. 288 (1871).
82 The local courts of Northwest became courts of Indiana in 1800 and continued
until 1805 when the four county courts (common pleas, quarter sessions, probate, and
orphans) were consolidated into one court of common pleas. INDIANA LAws 115. An
act regulating the administration of estates published in 1807 (id. at 270) provided for
appeal to "the General, or Circuit Courts." In 1812 the Illinois legislature declared that
the Illinois courts of common pleas should "possess and exercise the same jurisdiction
and powers" as possessed and exercised by the Indiana courts on March I, 1809. ILLINOIS
LAws 57. A law "concerning wills and intestacies" published in Michigan in 1805
(I MICHIGAN LAws 57), provided that "the courts of the several districts of Michigan, or
any judge of the said territory, or the clerk of the court of the district, shall have
power to take the proof of a will, and grant a certificate of such probate." What to do
in case of will contest was specified. In 1809 judges of probate were appointed under a
law copied from Vermont later declared invalid. For details of this controversy, see
Blume, supra note 77, at 222-24, 241. In 1810 the district courts were abolished by a
statute which declared "the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend
to all matters, above the value of one hundred dollars, &: to the probate of wills."
I MICHIGAN LAws 186. The supreme court was the only probate agency in the
territory from September 1810 to January 1811, when provision was made for
Registers of Probate. Id. at 160. A law copied from Massachusetts established probate
79
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appeal. Lack of ecclesiastical courts and, for a time, lack of courts
of chancery led to a great deal of experimentation. Separate courts
courts in 1818 with appeal to the supreme court. Id. at 341. In the territory south of
the Ohio which became Tennessee in 1796, the "superior court of law" established by
Congress was given chancery jurisdiction by the local legislature including cognizance
of "all suits and demands relative to legacies, filial portions, and estates of intestates."
1 TENNESSEE LAws 457. By the same statute (1794), the county courts of pleas and
quarter sessions were directed to take the probate of wills and to make orders relative
to letters testamentary and of administration. (Similar to the North Carolina statute
of 1777, id. at 185.) The county courts also had power to appoint guardians for "idiots
and lunatics," and to provide for the administration of their estates. "A law establishing
a court of probate" adopted in Mississippi in 1799 [MISS. HISTORICAL REcoRDs SURVEY,
SARGENT'S CoDE 1799-1800, at 19 (1939)] was a combination of two Northwest laws, one
adopted in 1788 (establishing a court of probate), and the other in 1795 (empowering
judges of probate to appoint guardians to minors and others). The first governor of
Mississippi, formerly secretary of Northwest, stated in 1800: "We began legislating
however, with the Laws of the Northwestern Territory only • • . .'' 1 THE MISSISSIPPI
TERRITORIAL AR.CHIVES 1793-1803, at 250 (Rowland ed. 1905). In 1802 county courts
replaced the several courts of probate, common pleas, and quarter sessions. Miss. Acts,
1st Gen. Ass., 1st &: 2d Sess. 21 (1802). In 1803 the justices of the county courts were
directed to hold orphans courts in each county "for taking the probate of wills and
granting letters of administration," and for "appointing guardians to minors, idiots,
lunatics, and persons non compos mentis." Miss. Acts, 2d Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1803); THE
STATUTES 'OF MISSISSIPPI TERRITORY 275 (Toulmin ed. 1805). Appeals could be taken to
the "superior court of the county or district.'' This law was in force during the period
of Alabama Territory and was in force in the state of Alabama in 1823. DIGEST OF THE
LAWS OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA 175 (Toulmin ed. 1823). For Louisiana (north of
Orleans), the governor and judges of Indiana established in 1804 judges and courts of
probate similar to those of Northwest. 1 LAWS OF LOUISIANA AND MISSOURI 57. Orphans
courts were added by the legislature in 1807. Id. at 125, 140. Inherited by Missouri,
the Louisiana acts were repealed in 1815 by a Missouri statute which conferred jurisdiction of probate and administration on the "circuit courts in the several counties.'' Id.
at 394, 420. Appeals to the "superior •court" were authorized. Inherited by Arkansas,
the Missouri act was modified in 1829 by an Arkansas statute which established "county
courts" and provided these courts should have jurisdiction of probate and administration.
STEELE &: M'CAMPBELL, LAws OF ARKANSAS TERRITORY 157 (1835). In 1804 the "Governor
of the Mississippi Territory, exercising the powers of Governor General and Intendant
of the Province of Louisiana" ordained the appointment of a "special administrator" for
Orleans to take charge of the estates of a certain class of intestates until ordinary
letters of administration should be issued. In 1807 the Orleans legislature made provision
for "parish" judges with "civil, criminal and police jurisdiction" (Miss. Acts, 2d Sess.,
1st Leg., ch. 1, § 10, at 14), "in lieu of judges of county courts" provided by an act passed
April 10, 1805. 1 McMAHON, LOUISIANA PRACTICE 4 (1939). Section 15 of the 1807 act
declared that the "parish judges" should have jurisdiction "in all matters relative to the
proof of wills, appointment of guardians and curators, according to the existing laws
of the territory, and the appointment of administrators in cases of persons deceased
intestate.'' According to Pound: "In Louisiana, where succession under the civil law
had always belonged to the ordinary courts, and no separate ecclesiastical jurisdiction
had existed, such matters were committed to the district courts and the functions of a
probate court were largely exercised by the clerks.'' POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 140
(1940). See also Simes, Model Probate Code and Probate Procedures in Louisiana, l
La. B.J., April 1954, p. 51; McMahon, The Background, Structure and Composition of
the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 7 La. B.J., Feb. 1960, p. 246. In 1821 General
Jackson, exercising the powers and authorities formerly exercised by the Captain General
and Intendant of Cuba, and by the Governors of East and West Florida (22 TERRITORIAL
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called "probate courts" were established in six of the twelve territories organized before 1836.83
The judicial system provided for Wisconsin in 1836,84 and
later established in fifteen other territories, included "probate
courts" as separate courts. Organization of these courts was left to
the territorial governments with freedom to provide local election
or appointment of the judges. The territorial governments could
not, however, confer on the probate courts any jurisdiction vested
by Congress in the superior judges appointed by the national
government. A Utah statute "conferring general jurisdiction in
chancery, and at law on the Probate Courts" was declared void
by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1874, Justice Miller
observing: "This view is supported by the decisions of the courts
of Kansas, on a similar statute; by decisions in Idaho, and by the
decisions of the Supreme Court whose judgment we are here called
on to reverse." 85 In 1887 Congress disapproved and annulled all
Utah laws that had conferred jurisdiction on probate courts "other
than in respect to the estates of deceased persons, and in respect of
the guardianship of the persons and property of infants, and in
respect of the persons and property of persons not of sound mind." 86

D. Divorce
In 1795 the governor and judges of Northwest conferred on the
"General Court" and circuit courts "sole cognizance of all divorces
PAPERS 9), ordained the establishment of county courts with jurisdiction of all criminal
cases and of all civil cases exceeding 20 dollars. ORDINANCES OF THE PROVINCES OF THE
FLORIDAS, BUT RELATING SPECIFICALLY TO WEST FLORIDA, AS PROCLAIMED BY MAJOR
GENERAL ANDREW JACKSON (McMurtrie ed. 1941). The Ordinance further provided "the
Alcaldes shall continue to exercise the powers of Judges of Probate, Registers of Wills,"
subject to appeal to the county court in all cases. The county courts as re-established in
1823 [l FLORIDA STAT. ANN. at lxx (1943)] were authorized in 1828 to take proof of wills,
issue letters of administration, hear complaints against guardians, and do generally the
work of a probate court. COMPILATION OF PUBLIC Acrs OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF
THE TERRITORY OF FLORIDA 168 (Duval ed. 1839).
83 Sec laws of Northwest, Indiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Louisiana (north of
Orleans), and Missouri, note 82 supra.
Si Wisconsin Organic Act of 1836, ch. 54, § 9, 5 Stat. 13.
SIS Ferris v. Higley, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 375, 384 (1874).
86 Anti-Polygamy Act of 1887, ch. 397, § 12, 24 Stat. 637. Jurisdiction other than that
specified in this statute was conferred by Congress on the following probate courts:
Colorado (common law and chancery not exceeding $2,000) Act of March 2, 1863,
ch. 70, § 3, 12 Stat. 700; Montana (civil not exceeding $500, criminal not requiring
jury) Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 150, § 2, 14 Stat. 426; Idaho (same as Montana) Act of
Dec. 13, 1870, ch. 1, 16 Stat. 395; Utah (divorce) Act of June 23, 1874, ch. 469, § 3,
18 Stat. 254.
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applied for or made." 87 The circuit courts referred to were supposed to be held by the superior judges at nisi prius. In England
divorces were granted either by ecclesiastical courts (a mensa et
thoro) or by Parliament (a vinculo matrimonii) but not by the
common-law courts or the Court of Chancery.88 That the Northwest legislators had power to confer this type of jurisdiction on the
"common law" court established by Congress has been denied,89
but in the absence of ecclesiastical courts the choice was between
leaving all divorces to the legislature or conferring divorce jurisdiction on a common-law or probate court.
By an act published in 180 I the governor and judges of Indiana
repealed the Northwest divorce law of 1795,00 but in 1803 declared
it should continue in force until the end of the first session of the
general assembly.91 A revision made in 1807 left unchanged the
provision conferring sole jurisdiction on "the General court, and
the Circuit courts." 92 A divorce was granted by the legislature in
1808, however, in an unusually complicated situation.93
The Indiana act of 1807, in force when Illinois was created out
of Indiana, appears in Pope's Digest of Illinois Laws (1815).9 '4 A
divorce was granted by the Illinois legislature in 1818, the statute
reciting that the petitioner "must be considerably injured if she
cannot obtain a divorce sooner than in the ordinary way." 95
A law "concerning the supreme court of the Territory of Michigan," published by the governor and judges of that Territory in
1805, conferred on the "common law" court established by Congress certain chancery powers, and "exclusive" jurisdiction of "all
causes of divorce and alimony." 96 After a period of uncertainty
(1805-1819), the divorce business of the court was classified as
chancery (1819-1832).97 After 1832 divorce actions were statutory.
In the period 1828-1831 at least seventeen divorces were granted
87
88

1 CHASE 192; PEASE 258.
See Woodhouse, The Marriage and Divorce Bill of 1857, 3

AM.

J.

LEGAL. H1sr.

260

(1959).
89 1 MARSHALL, A HisrORY OF THE COURTS AND LAWYERS OF OHIO 218 (1934),
90 INDIANA LAws 15.
91 Id. at 64, 66.
92 Id. at 323.
93 Id. at 648.
94 1 THE LAws OF INDIANA TERRITORY 1801-1809, at 117 (Philbrick ed. 1938).
95 ILLINOIS LAws 309.
96 1 MICHIGAN LAws 9.
97 For details, see Blume, Chancery Practice on the American Frontier, 59 MICH.

REv. 49, 60-64 (1960).
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by legislative acts. A bill in chancery for "alimony merely"-not
for divorce-was pending when the territorial court ceased to
exist in 1836.98 The state chancellor dismissed the bill observing
that "the whole current of authorities goes to show that courts of
chancery have never entertained jurisdiction in cases of this kind,
except in aid of some other court, or to carry into effect a marriage
contract, or in the execution of a trust." 99
Developments in the other eight territories organized before
I 836 show similar experimentation. Divorce laws were adopted
in (or inherited by) Mississippi 1803; 100 Louisiana (north of Orleans) 1807; 101 Orleans 1808; 102 Missouri 1812; 103 Alabama 1817; 10¼
Arkansas 1819; 105 Florida 1828.106 And in all except Orleans power
to grant absolute divorce was vested in the superior courts. In
Orleans "separation from bed and board" might be claimed in
"competent courts of justice." In the territory which became
Tennessee no divorce law was in force until enacted by the State
in I 799. 107 Legislative divorces were granted in Mississippi (I 7991800) ;108 in Orleans (1807). 109 Toulmin's 1823 Digest of Alabama
Laws110 contains "A list of Cases in which Laws granting Divorces
were passed during the existence of the Territorial Government of
Alabama Territory." Florida's divorce law was passed after Congress (1826) had disapproved and annulled "the several acts passed
by the governor and legislative council, granting divorces." 111
In Maynard v. Hill (1888) 112 the Supreme Court of the United
States was called upon to decide the validity of an Oregon legislative act which had granted a divorce in 1852. After a review of the
98 Peltier v. Peltier, Harr. Mich. Ch. Rep. 19 (1836).
119 Cf. DuPont v. DuPont, 32 Del. Ch. 413, 85 A.2d 724 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
100 THE STATUTES OF TIIE MISSISSIPPI TERRITORY 372 (Toulmin ed. 1807).
101 l LAws OF LouISIANA AND MISSOURI 90.
102 LAws OF TERRITORY OF LouISIANA 52 (Charless ed. 1808).
103 The Louisiana law of 1807, in force when Missouri replaced Louisiana,

was
amended in 1817. See I LAws OF LouISIANA AND MISSOURI 517.
10¼ The Mississippi law of 1803, in force when Alabama became a separate territory,
appears in TOULMIN, DIGEST OF TIIE LAWS OF TIIE STATE OF Af.ABAMA 252 (1823).
105 Portions of 1807 Louisiana Law and 1817 Missouri law appear in STEELE &
M'CAMPBELL, LAws OF .ARKANSAS TERRITORY 218 (1935).
106 PUBLIC Acrs OF TIIE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF TIIE TERRITORY OF FLORIDA 80
(Duval ed. 1839).
107 I TENNESSEE LAws 645.
108 MISS. HISTORICAL RECORDS SURVEY, SARGENT'S CODE 1799-1800, at ll2, 126 (1939).
109 LoUISIANA LAws, 2d Sess., 1st Leg. 78, 80, 90, 94, 138 (1807).
110 TOULMIN, op. cit. supra note 104, at 254.
111 Act of May 15, 1826, ch. 46, § 13, 4 Stat. 167.
112 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
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history of legislative divorce, the Court held that power to grant
divorces was included when Congress provided in the Organic
Act (1848) that the legislative power of the Territory should "extend to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States." Congress had declared
in 1886 that territorial legislatures should not pass "local or special
laws ... granting divorces," 113 leaving this type of jurisdiction exclusively, to the courts.
Though it was held after 1836 that jurisdiction of divorce was
not included in the "common law" and "chancery" jurisdiction
conferred on the superior courts by Congress,114 it was assumed that
this type of jurisdiction could be given to these courts by local
legislation. This had always been done, and not disapproved. In
Iowa, for instance, an act passed in 1840 provided that "the district courts as courts of chancery" should have "original jurisdiction in all cases of divorce and alimony and guardianship connected
therewith." 115 Divorce laws passed in unincorporated territories
involved different grants of both legislative and judicial powers.
For consideration of the validity of a divorce law of the Virgin
Islands, see Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, decided by Supreme Court of the United States in 1955.116
E.

AnMIRALITY

By "An Act to provide for the more convenient organization
of the Courts of the United States" approved February 13, 1801,117
Congress declared that one federal district should consist of "the
territory of the United States northwest of the Ohio, and the
Indiana territory, to be called the district of Ohio." This court
was in operation only a short time, being abolished in 1802 by an
act effective July 1.118
In 1802 and 1803 actions to forfeit certain goods were comAct of July 30, 1886, ch. 818, 24 Stat. 170.
Kenyon v. Kenyon, 3 Utah 431, 24 Pac. 829 (1861).
m, IowA LAws 1839-1841, at 120. By an act approved June 23, 1874, Congress
provided that the Utah probate courts should have "jurisdiction of suits for divorce for
statutory causes concurrently with the district courts." Utah Judiciary Act of 1874, ch.
469, § 3, 18 Stat. 253.
116 349 U.S. 1 (1955).
117 Ch. 4, § 4, 2 Stat. 89.
118 Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132. For instructions to the court's marshal,
see 3 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 172.
113
114
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menced by libels in an Indiana court of common pleas.119 On
appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court a question arose as to
whether a locally-created common-law court had jurisdiction of
this type of case. Writing from Vincennes, March 12, 1804, John
Rice Jones, an attorney at that place, stated:
"On examining the Revenue law I find that all penalties
&c accruing by breach of that law are to be sued in any Court
proper to try the same, which court by the whole tenor of
the act applies to the judicial district (of the Federal Court)
in which the penalty shall have accrued-this seems to
imply an exclusive Jurisdiction in that Court; if that should
be the case, the Court of Common Pleas can have none." 120
On March 3, 1805, Congress provided that the superior courts
of the several territories of the United States, in which a district
court had not been established, should, "in all cases in which the
United States are concerned, have and exercise, within their respective territories, the same jurisdiction and powers which are
by law given to, or may be exercised by the district court of
Kentucky district." 121 By this act the superior courts of the territories were given exclusive, original jurisdiction of all crimes and
offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States; of
civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction which concerned the United States; of seizures under laws of impost, navigation and trade of the United States; and of suits for penalties
and forfeitures under the laws of the United States. They were
given concurrent, original jurisdiction of all suits in equity where
the matter in dispute exceeded five hundred dollars and the United
States was plaintiff, and of all actions at law where the matter in
dispute amounted to one hundred dollars and the United States
was plaintiff.
The exception in the above statute indicates that Congress
contemplated two types of territories-those in which "federal"
district courts would be established, and those in which separate
"federal" courts would not be established. The separate court for
1111 For references to the papers in these cases, see Blume, Civil Procedure on the
American Frontier, 56 MICH. L. REv. 161, 180-82, 223 (1957).
120 Sibley Papers, Burton Historical Collection, Public Library, Detroit, Michigan.
121 Act of March 3, 1805, ch. 38, 2 Stat. 338. The district court of Kentucky district,
in. addition to a district court's jurisdiction, had jurisdiction of all cases, except appeals
and writs of error, cognizable in a circuit court. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 10, I
Stat. 77. Jurisdiction of the two federal courts is detailed in the Act of 1789.
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Northwest and Indiana had been abolished,122 but in 1804 Congress had established in Orleans "a district court" to consist of
one judge who should have and exercise "the same jurisdiction and
powers, which are by law given to, or may be exercised by the
judge of Kentucky district." 123 The jurisdiction of the Orleans
judge was not limited to cases "in which the United States are
concerned."
A common type of admiralty case which concerned the United
States was one in which a libel was filed to forfeit to the United
States property seized under federal laws of impost, navigation,
or trade. 124 Where the seizure was made on the high seas or on
waters navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons
burden, the libel for forfeiture was a civil cause of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, and trial was by the court. Where, however, the seizure was made on land or on waters not navigable from
the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burden, the libel or information for forfeiture was a proceeding at common law, according to
the course of the English Exchequer, and trial by jury was required.
The first case125 tried in the Supreme Court of Michigan
(1805) was a libel to forfeit certain lumber landed at Detroit without a permit. Although the seizure was made on land, the case was
tried without a jury. No question was raised as to the propriety
of treating it as a case within the admiralty jurisdiction of the
court. Nor was any question raised as to whether the Great Lakes
and the rivers connecting them were water navigable from the sea
by vessels of ten or more tons burden within the meaning of the
act of 1789. That the judges of Michigan sat as a court of admiralty
is shown not only from the forms of their proceedings and from
the fact they tried libels for forfeiture without juries, but also
from a rule adopted in 1811 which fixed the time within which
libels had to be filed in "admiralty cases." The records of the
"admiralty side" of the court were separated from the other
122 See note 118 supra.
123 Orleans Organic Act of 1804, ch. 38, § 8, 2 Stat. 285.
124 This paragraph and part of that following are from 1 TRANSACTIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1805-1814, xlvii (Blume ed. 1935), where

brief source references are given.
125 United States v. Boards, Planks &: Shingles claimed by Bissell &: Fitch, as reported
in 1 TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1805-1814, at
48 (Blume ed. 1935).
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records in 1815, and, according to a rule adopted at that time, the
"admiralty side" was to sit on certain days "exclusively for the
transaction of business as a circuit and district court of the United
States." Though, as pointed out on another occasion,126 the court
on its "admiralty side" was not a court "of the United States," and
the bulk of its business on that side not "admiralty," the practice
of separate sittings and records was continued until the end of
the territorial government (1836).
According to an editorial in the Michigan Herald (Detroit)
of March 29, 1826, a committee of Congress had reported doubt
whether the judges of Michigan possessed "admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction," saying: "Legally speaking, however, there are no
admiralty or maritime causes in the Territory." The writer of
the editorial, after referring to the admiralty jurisdiction conferred
by the Act of 1805, stated:
"These fresh water seas are bordered by a foreign nation, and
by different states of the Union, possessing jurisdictions independent of each other, and are actually 'navigable from
the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burthen.' This latter
circumstance may be no otherwise material than to show the
extent and variety of the maritime transactions which do and
may exist in relation to the commerce of the lakes. It is easy
to conceive that seamen, ship builders, freighters, part owners,
and others, including foreigners as well as citizens, may have
rights and claims requiring the aid of a maritime and admiralty court. Among the numerous causes requiring the
same aid, we will mention that of salvage, which it is easy to
conceive may arise on the lakes as well as on the ocean.
. . . We respectfully submit to the consideration of the
committee the propriety of reconsidering the subject, and
if it should not be thought expedient to give us a District
Court, at least to extend to the present judges maritime and
admiralty jurisdiction, and leave them to decide what causes
do and what do not come within that power."
In 1818 Congress had provided that the powers of the "general
court" of Alabama should extend to "all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction. " 127
120
127

See Blume, supra note 97, at 57.
Act of April 20, 1818, ch. 127, 3 Stat. 468.
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The "federal" jurisdiction given the superior courts of Florida
(1822) differed from that conferred generally on the superior courts
of all territories not having federal district courts. The latter was
the same as Kentucky district, but limited to cases which "concerned" the United States. In Florida it was the same as Kentucky
district, but limited to "cases arising under the laws and constitution of the United States."128 In 1823 the territorial legislature
undertook to confer on a municipal court jurisdiction over salvage.
The validity of a judgment rendered by the court was upheld by
the Supreme Court of the United States in American Insurance
Co. v. Canter, 129 and in doing so the Court rejected an argument
that exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty and maritime cases had
been vested in the Florida superior courts. Chief Justice Marshall
pointed out: (1) Admiralty cases do not arise under federal law,
hence were not included in the grant of jurisdiction of cases arising
under federal law. (2) Jurisdiction exercised by territorial courts
is not part of the judicial power defined in Article III of the
Constitution. Subsequent to the original judgment Congress had
provided that the superior courts of Florida should have
" . . . original and exclusive cognisance of all civil causes
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures
under laws of impost, navigation, or trade of the United States,
whether such seizures be made on land or water, and of all
suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws
of the United States; and original, but not exclusive jurisdiction, of all suits in which the United States shall be a
party, whatever may be the amount in controversy in such
causes and suits; and shall have and exercise appellate jurisdiction, in all civil causes, originating in the inferior courts
of said territory, whatever may be the amount in controversy. . . ." 130
The superior courts established in Wisconsin in 1836, and in
fifteen later territories, were given "the same jurisdiction, in all
cases arising under the constitution and laws of the United States
as is vested in the circuit and district courts of the United States."
The courts were directed to use the first six days of each term, if
128
120
130

Act of March 3, 1823, ch. 28, § 8, 3 Stat. 752.
26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
Act of May 15, 1826, ch. 46, 4 Stat. 164.
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needed, for the trial of these cases. In Washington, where the
words "and the laws of said Territory" had been inserted, after
"laws of the United States," the supreme court was startled in
1877 by a claim that the district courts had no admiralty jurisdiction. Justice Greene noted:
"Bench and bar have, without questioning, assumed that
cases of admiralty and maritime cognizance arise either under
the laws of the United States or under the laws of the Territory. And upon this assumption, be it well grounded or
otherwise, the Territorial District Courts have uniformly and
continuously exercised in such cases the same jurisdiction as
is exercised in like cases by the District courts of the United
States." 131
The court's conclusion that a case arising under admiralty and
maritime law was a case arising under the laws of the United States
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
City of Panama in 1879.132

F.

BANKRUPTCY

The Bankruptcy Act of 1841133 (repealed in 1843) conferred
on the "supreme or superior courts" of the territories the same
jurisdiction in bankruptcy as vested by the act in the "district
court" of the United States. Similar jurisdiction was given to the
territorial "supreme courts" by the Bankruptcy Act of 1867134
(repealed 1878). This act was amended in 1874 by changing
"supreme courts" to "district courts."135 In 1898 "the district
courts of the United States in the several States, the supreme court
of the District of Columbia, the district courts of the several Territories, and the United States courts in the Indian Territory
and the District of Alaska" were made courts of bankruptcy with
"such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to
exercise original jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings." 136
Phelps v. S.S. City of Panama, 1 Wash. Terr. 518, 523 (1877).
101 U.S. 453 (1879).
Ch. 9, § 16, 5 Stat. 448.
Bankruptcy Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 49, 14 Stat. 541.
Bankruptcy Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, § 16, 18 Stat. 182. See also Act of
June 30, 1870, ch. 177, 16 Stat. 173.
136 Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 2, 30 Stat. 545.
131
132
133
134
1315
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APPELLATE

By an act adopted in 1795 the governor and judges of Northwest provided that persons aggrieved by the judgment of any court
of record within the Territory might have a writ of error returnable
to the General Court.137 In 1788 the General Court of Northwest
had been authorized to hear probate appeals,138 and, from the
beginning, the court's common law power to issue writs of error,
certiorari, and habeas corpus had been recognized. In the territory
south of the Ohio which became Tennessee in 1796 the "superior
courts" held by the judges appointed by the national government
were given "power and authority to grant writs of error for correcting the errors of any inferior courts."139 The Mississippi judicature act of 1799140 contained a provision for writs of error to
local courts of record the same as, in fact copied from, the
Northwest provision of 1795. A later Mississippi law adopted in
1799 provided for a "supreme Court of Appeals" to be held by at
least two of the superior judges with jurisdiction of cases "brought
before them by appeal from any inferior court." 141 One of the first
acts of the governor and judges of Indiana (1801) was to frame "a
law to regulate the practice of the General Courts upon Appeals
and Writs of Error." 142
Under the nisi prius system established in Northwest in 1795,148
one judge could try cases on circuit but could not make final decisions or render judgment. Questions of law were decided by the
central court, and any injustice corrected by the central court on
motion. When this scheme was modified in Indiana in 1807 by
authorizing the circuit judge to render final judgment and pass
on motions for new trial, provision was made for review by a bill
of exceptions.144 In Mississippi the act of 1805 that authorized
each superior judge to hold a district court145 provided that
the judges of the "Supreme Court" should have
" ... full jurisdiction therein to hear and determine all causes
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

l

CHASE 148; PEASE 156.

1 CHASE 96; PEASE 9.

1 TENNESSEE LAws § 37, at 457.
MISS. HISTORICAL RECORDS SURVEY, SARGENT'S CODE 1799-1800, at 7 (1939).
Id. at 121.
INDIANA LAws 3.
I CHASE 147; PEASE 154.
INDIANA LAws 230.
Miss. Acts, 3d Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. 55 (1805).

1962]

TERRITORIAL COURTS AND LAW

73

brought before them by writ of error from any court of record
in this Territory, all demurrers, points reserved at the trial,
cases stated, special verdicts, motions in arrest of judgment,
and for new trials, reserved for their consideration at any
circuit court.... "
This provision, it will be noted, authorized review by the methods
employed in a nisi prius system as well as by writ of error.
The supreme-general-superior court originally established by
the Northwest Ordinance was primarily a trial court with unlimited common-law jurisdiction. Its appellate jurisdiction was not
spelled out by Congress and was gradually developed by local
legislation. In Mississippi the supreme court of 1805 was an appellate court, and court of chancery. By an act passed in 1814 the
"Supreme Court of Mississippi" became "The Supreme Court of
Errors and Appeals," with appellate jurisdiction only, to be exercised by writs of error, and other common-law writs.146 "Superior
circuit courts" established in Michigan in 1833147 were circuit
appellate courts held by the judges of the supreme court. In 1815
Congress, for the first time, established a territorial court with
appellate jurisdiction only-the ':Court of Appeals" of Illinois.
This court was authorized to review the judgments and decrees of
circuit courts held by individual superior judges, as well as of inferior courts established in the Territory, by means of appeals and
writs of error according to the principles of the common law. 148
The Florida "court of appeals" established by Congress in 1824149
was given appellate jurisdiction only. Until regulated by the
Florida legislature, writs of error to and appeals from the superior
courts held by individual judges were to be taken and prosecuted
as in "the next adjoining states."
The standardized judicial system, first established in Wisconsin in 1836, was headed by a supreme court which was to exercise
appellate jurisdiction only; in no case removed to the supreme
court was trial by jury to be allowed. Congress provided that
146
147
148

STATUTES OF

THE MISSISSIPPI

TERRITORY 200 (1816).

3 MICHIGAN LAws 1020.

Act of March 3, 1815, ch. 98, § 15, 3 Stat. 238; 17 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 139. This
had been preceded by a similar territorial statute in 1814. See "A LAW Establishing a
Supreme Court, and DOCUMENTS, published by a Joint Resolution of the LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, and House of Representatives, of Illinois Territory" reproduced in 17
id. at 55-96.
149 Act of May 26, 1824, ch. 163, § 4, 4 Stat. 46.
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"writs of error, bills of exception, and appeals in chancery cases"
should be allowed from the "final decisions" of the district courts,
but did not expressly confer power to review the decisions of the
inferior courts to be established by the local legislature. In the
period before 1836 the "supreme" or "superior" judges appointed
by the national government had reviewed the judgments of inferior courts, and it was assumed that this might be authorized
under the system first established in 1836. In Iowa, for example,
an act passed in 1842150 provided that the supreme court should
"exercise appellate jurisdiction only" and have
". . . final and conclusive jurisdiction of all matters of appeal, error, or complaint, from the judgments or decrees of
any of the District Courts of this Territory, and from such
other inferior courts as may hereafter be established by law,
in all matters of law and equity."
At this point it may be observed that the three-judge commonlaw trial court originally established by the Northwest Ordinance,
after becoming a court of almost unlimited original and appellate
jurisdiction, ultimately exercised appellate jurisdiction only. The
tradition of having all superior trial courts held by a bench of
judges gave way to the idea that one judge may properly hold a
trial court provided his decisions are subject to review by the
other superior judges sitting in bank. The nisi prius system first
established in Northwest, under which proceedings on circuit
could be reviewed on simple motion made to the court in bank
prior to judgment, was eventually replaced by a circuit system
under which the circuit judges rendered final judgments subject
to review by means of formal writs of error, bills of exception, and
equity appeals. Under the nisi prius system the superior courts
were in reality one court; they had later become separate courts.
Although identity of personnel remained, and the appellate judges
were experienced trial judges, even this identity of personnel was
objected to. In some of the territories, after the number of judges
had been increased, a judge could not sit in review of his own
circuit court judgments.151
150 LAws OF TIIE TERRITORY OF IowA,

ch. 47, at 34 (1841).
151 Note 262 infra.

Session Commencing

first

Monday of Dec.,
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REVIEW BY FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS

After Congress had authorized (1792) one of the "supreme or
superior" judges of Northwest to hold a court "in the absence of
the other judges," 152 Governor St. Clair (1794) reported to the
Secretary of State that "many representations" had been made to
him on the subject of permitting one judge to determine the whole
property of the Territory "without the possibility of having that
determination revised." 153 The governor recommended that the
law empowering one judge to hold a court be repealed, and some
mode prescribed for having the decisions of the territorial supreme
court reviewed by the "Federal Court." In February 1803 a writ
of error from the Supreme Court of the United States to the
"General Court" of Northwest was quashed on the ground that it
had not been authorized by act of Congress. 154
In December 1803 the congressional committee referred to
under "Chancery" above, reported:

"As to the second matter referred to them for their inquiry [expediency of allowing writs of error and appeals from
the judgments and decrees of the judges of the United States
within the Indiana and other territories], the committee beg
leave to observe, that the attainment of a uniformity of decision in any section of country subject to the same laws and
usages, is one of the principal objects of the institution of a
Supreme Court, with appellate jurisdiction. Where there are
many courts dispersed over a country, though subject to the
same laws and usages, yet, without one common tribunal,
which shall have power to revise and correct the judgments
and decrees of the inferior courts, their decisions will be
various and contradictory. But to attain this uniformity of
decision in each Territorial Government, it is not necessary
to allow ·writs of error or appeals to the Supreme Court of the
United States, because each Territory has a supreme court
(relatively speaking) within itself, which is composed of three
judges and has, or may have appellate jurisdiction over all
others erected in the Territory, whereby it may preserve that
uniform rule of decision so desirable.
"Correctness, or propriety of decision, is the only other
1112
1113
111(

Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 42, § 4, 1 Stat. 286.
2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 499.
Clark v. Bazadone, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 212 (1803).
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object the attainment of which can be aided by allowing writs
of error and appeals from the Territorial courts to the Supreme Court of the United States. The committee are not
informed nor do they believe, that there is any unusual want
of confidence in the courts of the Territories. They are
aware that hardships and injustice will result to individuals
in some instances from the erroneous decision of those courts,
but it has not occurred to them that an appeal will insure infallible relief. Infallibility is not the attribute of any earthly
tribunal. So vast is the distance from the Territorial courts
to the Supreme Court of the United States, that the mischief
resulting from the necessary delay, expense, and inconvenience of prosecuting or defending writs of error and appeals
cannot, in the opinion of the committee, be compensated by
any advantage to be derived from the revision of the courts
of the Territories, by the Supreme Court of the United
States." 155
After Congress had conferred (1805) on the superior territorial
courts same-as-federal jurisdiction in cases concerning the United
States,156 the above committee's well-stated opinion of the functions of appellate review (1. To unify the law. 2. To see that
justice is done in individual cases.) was still valid, but its conclusion could not stand. A territorial supreme court might unify
territorial law in state-type cases, and see that justice was done in
individual cases, but could not unify the law applicable to federaltype cases. The Act of 1805 provided for these cases that "writs of
error and appeals shall lie, from decisions therein, to the supreme
court [of the United States], for the same causes, and under the
same regulations, as from the said district court of Kentucky district." Appeal from the "General Court" of Alabama in admiralty
and maritime cases was authorized in 1818.157 And when the
superior courts of Florida were given same-as-federal jurisdiction
of "cases arising under the laws and constitution of the United
States" (1823),158 provision was made for appeals and writs of error
to the United States court, as was again done when the same-asfederal jurisdiction was expanded in 1826.159 The district court
155 ANNALS OF CoNG., 8th Cong., 2d Sess. 1578 (1803).
156 See note 121 supra.
157 Act of April 20, 1818, ch. 127, 3 Stat. 468.
158 Act of March 3, 1823, ch. 28, § 8, 3 Stat. 752.
159 Act of May 15, 1826, ch. 46, § 5, 4 ?tat. 165.
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of Orleans (established 1804) was a federal court subject to review
without special provision. 160
In the period before 1836 review by the Supreme Court of the
United States of state-type territorial cases was authorized in a few
instances-decisions of the "highest tribunal" of Michigan in cases
exceeding $1,000 (1825); 161 of the "superior court" of Arkansas in
certain land cases (1824), 162 and of cases exceeding $1,000 (1828); 168
of the "superior courts" of Florida in cases exceeding $1,000
(1823).m
The organic acts of Wisconsin (1836) and Iowa (1838), after
authorizing review of district court decisions by the territorial
supreme court in both state-type and federal-type cases, provided
for "writs of error and appeals" from the final decisions of the
territorial supreme court to the Supreme Court of the United
States in cases involving more than $1,000. Under the organic acts
of Oregon (1848) and Washington (1853) the minimum amount
in controversy had to exceed $2,000 except in cases questioning
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. That the
provision for Wisconsin and Iowa became the standardized or
established provision is shown by section 1909 of the Revised
Statutes of 1873-74:
"Writs of error and appeals from the final decisions of the
supreme court of either of the Territories of New Mexico,
Utah, Colorado, Dakota, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, shall be allowed to the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the same manner and under the same regulations
as from the circuit courts of the United States, where the
value of the property or the amount in controversy . . . exceeds one thousand dollars . . . ."
Special provision was made for review of decisions "upon writs of
habeas corpus." Review of specified Utah criminal cases was authorized in 1874.165 An act applicable to all territories passed in
1885166 increased the jurisdictional amount to $5,000, but ex160 Sere v. Pitot, IO U.S. (6 Cranch) 332 (1810); Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S.
(6 Cranch) 307 (1810); Morgan v. Callender, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 370 (1808).
161 Act of Feb. 5, 1825, ch. 6, § 5, 4 Stat. 81
162 Act of May 26, 1824, ch. 173, § 2, 4 Stat. 53.
168 Act of April 17, 1828, ch. 29, § 5, 4 Stat. 262.
164 Act of March 3, 1823, ch. 28, § 7, 3 Stat. 752.
165 Territory of Utah Judiciary Act of 1874, ch. 469, § 3, 18 Stat. 253.
166 Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 355, 23 Stat. 443.
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cepted cases either involving patents and copyrights,167 or questioning the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States. When
the circuit courts of appeal were established in 1891,168 these courts
were authorized to review the decisions of the territorial courts
"and for that purpose the several Territories shall, by orders of the
Supreme Court, to be made from time to time, be assigned to particular circuits."
An act of Congress passed in 1874169 directed that territorial
jury cases be reviewed by "writ of error"; other cases by "appeal"
"Provided, That on appeal, instead of the evidence at large,
a statement of the facts of the case in the nature of a special
verdict, and also the rulings of the court on the admission or
rejection of evidence when excepted to, shall be made and
certified by the court below, and transmitted to the Supreme
Court [of the United States] together with the transcript of
the proceedings and judgment or decree."
Substitution of appeals in the nature of writs of error indicates that
Congress was concerned with the "attainment of a uniformity of
decision" (report of congressional committee of 1803),170 and
not with the "correctness or propriety of decision" (justice in
particular cases) referred to in the report. By including in the
scheme of federal review state-type as well as federal-type cases,
Congress tightened the control of the national government over
its colonies.
APPOINTMENT, TENURE, AND REMOVAL OF SUPERIOR
COURT JUDGES

The congressional act of 1789 that adapted the Northwest
Ordinance to the Constitution of the United States provided that
the President should appoint officers which by the Ordinance were
to be appointed "by the United States in Congress assembled," and
that where Congress might, "by the said ordinance," revoke any
commission or remove from any office, the President might do the
same.171 The Ordinance had provided that the territorial gover161 The Trade-Mark Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 17, 33 Stat. 728, 15 U.S.C. § 1121
(1958), gave tbe territorial courts original jurisdiction of "all suits at law or in equity
respecting trade marks."
168 Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 13, 26 Stat. 829.
169 Act of April 7, 1874, ch. 80, § 2, 18 Stat. 27.
170 See note 155 supra.
171 Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, § 2, 1 Stat. 53.
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nor's commission should continue three years, "unless sooner revoked by Congress"; that the Secretary's commission continue four
years, "unless sooner revoked." Though nothing was said in the
Ordinance about revoking the commissions of the judges, which
were to continue "during good behaviour," Attorney General
Cushing argued to the Supreme Court, in United States v. Guthrie172 in 1854, that as the old Congress possessed power to remove
for misbehavior, this "precise power" was vested in the President
by the congressional act of 1789. It should be noted, however,
that when charges of misconduct were made against Judge Turner
of Northwest in 1796,173 the President, instead of considering the
charges himself, instructed the Secretary of State "to give orders
to Governor St. Clair to take the necessary measures for bringing
that officer to a fair trial, respecting those charges, before the court
of that Territory, according to the laws of the land."
The case before the Supreme Court in 1854 involved the removal of a Minnesota territorial judge before the end of his fouryear term. Whether the President had power to remove a territorial
judge was argued at length, but not decided. Justice McLean, dissenting, was strongly of the opinion that the President had no such
power. After reviewing the provisions of the several organic acts,
McLean pointed out that only in two were there provisions for
removal, "but whether this language was the result of accident,
or design" it did not apply to the other territories. Referring to
the act of 1789, he declared:
". . . Under the ordinance, as above stated, the judges were
appointed during good behavior, while all the other officers
were appointed for a term of years, unless sooner removed.
"If congress have the power to create the territorial courts,
of which no one doubts, it has the power to fix the tenure of
office. This being done, the President has no more power to
remove a territorial judge, than he has to repeal a law. The
duties of a judge of a territory are discharged as independently, and as free from executive control, as are the duties of
a judge of this court. This territorial judicial power was intended to be a check upon the executive power. And it would
be inconsistent with the principles of our government, for the
judges to be subject to removal by the executive.
172
173

United States v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284, 290 (1854).
3 HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF RF.PRESENTATIVES 983 (1907).
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"This is a great question, although it can only affect, as
now maintained, the territorial bench. And I regret that, from
the want of jurisdiction, in the opinion of my brethren, they
are not required to express an opinion as to the power asserted."1H

"An act regulating the Tenure of certain Civil Offices" passed
by Congress in 1867175-amended in 1869176-provided for the suspension and removal of officers appointed by the President "by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, except judges of the
United States courts." Whether the exception included territorial
judges was considered by the Supreme Court in two cases decided
in 1891-McAllister v. United States111 and Wingard v. United
States178-one involving an Alaska judge; the other a judge of
Washington Territory. After elaborate argument and full consideration the Court held that territorial courts were not "courts
of the United States," and assumed, according to Justice Harlan,
that the words "judges of the courts of the United States," were
used with reference to the "recognized distinction between courts
of the United States and merely territorial or legislative courts."
Justice Field, dissenting, did not agree that because territorial
courts were not constitutional courts, they were not courts of the
United States "in any sense" and therefore "bereft of that independence which is deemed so essential in the judges of the courts
under the Constitution." Independence of the judiciary was "a
great question" although only the "territorial bench" was involved,
and the pertinent statutory provisions had been repealed in 1887.179
When impeachment of Judge Turner of Northwest was under
consideration in 1796, Attorney General Lee declared that trial
before the Senate would be impracticable because of "the expense,
the delay, the certain difficulty, if not impossibility of obtaining
the attendance [at Philadelphia] of the witnesses who reside in the
Territory northwest of the Ohio, about the distance of 1,500
miles." 180 In 1833 a committee of Congress was of the opinion that a
United States v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284, 312 (1854).
Ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (March 2, 1867).
176 Act of April 5, 1869, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 6.
177 141 U.S. 174 (1891).
178 141 U.S. 201 (1891). Appended to the dissenting opinion at 203 is a list
exhibiting the terms of the judges in all the territories.
179 Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500.
180 3 HINDS, op. cit. supra note 173, § 2486, at 982.
174

175
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territorial judge was "not a proper subject of trial by impeachment"
under article II of the Constitution, not being an officer "of the
United States." 181 The committee called attention to the fact that
the Arkansas judge in question had been appointed for only four
years, and might be removed by the President at any time. Earlier
attempts to have territorial judges impeached had failed for one
reason or another. 182 Whether territorial judges might be removed
by impeachment was the subject of an opinion given by Attorney
General Grundy to the House Committee on Territories in 1839.183
Under consideration was a bill to amend the Wisconsin Organic
Act of 1838. This opinion reads in part:
"Congress has in most cases limited the tenure of office
of Territorial judges to four years. This could not be done
were they judges under or provided for by the Constitution,
because by that instrument the tenure is during good behavior. It should be noticed that Congress has imposed this
limitation of four years, not in a single instance only, but in
many. It has been imposed in the Territories embraced within
the limits of the original States, where the Territory has been
ceded to the General Government, and Territorial governments have been created therein. It has also been done in the
Territories purchased by the United States from foreign nations. I think these acts clearly prove the sense of Congress
to be that Territorial judges are not judges under the Constitution, but are mere creatures of legislation.
"I have said that the Supreme Court of the United States
have also decided upon this point. In the case of the American
Insurance Company and others v. Canter, reported in first
Peters, the court very distinctly recognized the opinion above
expressed, and convey their views in the following strong
language: 'These courts (meaning Territorial courts), then,
are not constitutional courts, in which the judicial power
conferred by the Constitution on the General Government
can be deposited; they are incapable of receiving it; they are
legislative courts, created in virtue of the general rights of
sovereignty.'
"The only remaining inquiry is as to the liability of Terri3 HINDS, op. cit. supra note 173, at 991.
Id., § 2486 (Judge George Turner, Northwest, 1796) § 2487 (Judge Peter B.
Bruin, Mississippi, 1808), § 2488 (Judge Harry Toulmin, Mississippi, 1811), § 2490
(Judge Joseph L. Smith, Florida, 1825 & 1826).
183 Id.,§ 2022, at 359.
181
182
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torial judges to impeachment under the Constitution. The
fourth section of the second article of the Constitution is in
these words: 'The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high
crimes and misdemeanors.'
"If the construction of the Constitution be correct, as I
suppose it is, that these judges are not constitutional but legislative judges, I can see nothing in the Constitution which
would warrant their being embraced by the expression, 'and
all civil officers of the United States.' They are not civil officers
of the United States in the constitutional meaning of the
phrase. They are merely Territorial officers, and therefore,
in my opinion, not subject to impeachment and trial before
the Senate of the United States."
The outline of the judicial systems prior to 1836, above,184
shows that prior to 1836 the superior judges of the territories established in the area relinquished by England in 1783 were to
serve during good behavior; those of the territories created out of
the Louisiana and Florida purchases, to serve four years. The
reasons why in Michigan good behavior tenure was changed to
four-year tenure in 1824 are indicated by a letter written by James
D. Doty (a young lawyer in Detroit) to Henry R. Schoolcraft,
October 25, 1822:
"The good work has commenced here. Uudges] Woodward & Griffin are likely to have something happen to them.
If you take the Detroit Gazette you will perceive their conduct for years past is presented to them for their inspectionA petition will probably be presented to Congress praying for
a repeal of the Ordinance under which they hold their offices.
This is a modest way of turning a man out of office." 181,
By an act approved March 3, 1823, Congress provided that the
tenure of the Michigan judges should be limited to four years, and
that on February I, 1824, and every four years thereafter the office
of each judge should become vacant.186 Judge Griffin resigned; 187
Page 45 supra.
11 TERRITORIAL p APERS 270.
Act of March 3, 1823, ch. 36, § 3, 3 Stat. 769.
11 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 444. A letter opposing his reappointment had been sent to
the President by members of the Detroit bar. Id. at 434.
184
18G
186
187
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Judge Woodward was not re-appointed.188 After his letter to
Schoolcraft, and before the act of Congress was approved, Doty
was appointed "additional" territorial judge, to hold office "during
his good behaviour, or during the existence of the [territorial]
Government." 189 Failing reappointment in 1832 he wrote the
Secretary of State: 190
"I deem it my duty to inform the government, that by
my commission issued by the President on the 17th. day of
February 1823, I am entitled 'to have and to hold the said
office,' 'during good behaviour.' I have taken the advice of legal
gentlemen who concur in the opinion that my commission was
not affected by the Acts of Congress subsequently passed."
Doty's claim was not sustained, but it is of interest to note that
good-behavior tenure was restored when Wisconsin was created
out of Michigan in 1836.
When Iowa was created out of Wisconsin in 1838, "good behaviour" tenure was changed to "four years" and this became the
standard provision. The adoption of short-term tenure for all
territorial judges made it possible for the President to get rid of
an unsatisfactory judge by not re-appointing him. Furthermore,
the President was expressly authorized to remove judges appointed
for Alaska (1900; 1948); 191 Puerto Rico (1900); 192 Hawaii (1900;
1950); 193 Canal Zone (1934; 1938); 194 Guam (1950); 195 Virgin Islands (1954).196
REGULATION OF SUPERIOR COURT PROCEDURE

The Northwest Ordinance (1787), after conferring on the
superior judges "a common law jurisdiction," guaranteed to the
188 For evidence that Woodward was a victim of misrepresentations, see I1 TERRITORIAL
PAPERS 441-44, and W'ooDFORD, A LIFE OF JUSTICE WOODWARD-MR. JEFFERSON'S DISCIPLE,
ch. IX {1953).
189 11 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 344, 345.
100 12 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 521, 522,
191 Alaska Civil Code, ch. 786, § 10, 31 Stat. 325 (1900), as amended, ch. 646, § 13, 62
Stat. 987 (1948).
102 Puerto Rico Civil Code, ch. 191, § 34, 31 Stat. 84 (1900), 48 U.S.C. § 863 (1958).
193 Hawaiian Organic Act of 1900, ch. 339, § 82, 31 Stat. 157, as amended, ch. 250, 64
Stat. 216 (1950).
194 Panama Canal Act of Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 370, 28 U.S.C. § 1294(3) (1958); Canal
Zone Code, ch. 667, 28 U.S.C. § 610 (1958).
105 Organic Act of Guam of 1950, ch. 512, § 24, 64 Stat. 390, 48 U.S.C. § 1424b {1958).
196 Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands, ch. 558, § 24, 68 Stat. 506 (1954),
48 u.s.c. § 1614 (1958).
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inhabitants trial by jury, and "proceedings according to the course
of the common law." Two general questions had to be answered:
(1) Were the territorial courts to be governed by the same procedural regulations as governed the federal courts? (2) If not, was
local regulation to be by common law, statute, or rules of court?
The Northwest court was established prior to the federal courts,
and was not a court "of the United States." That this was recognized by the governor and judges of Northwest is shown by the fact
that they adopted several statutes containing provisions similar to
those enacted by Congress to govern the federal courts.197
As long as the judges of Northwest controlled local legislation198
(the governor having but one vote and no veto),199 there was little
or no occasion for careful consideration of the line which should
separate regulation of procedure by statute from regulation of procedure by rule of court. A review of Northwest laws published
1795-1798 gives some indication where the line was drawn:
"The governor and judges of the Northwest Territory
published thirty-eight laws in 1795, none in 1796 or 1797, and
eleven in 1798. Approximately one half of these laws contained provisions which, to some extent, either defined the
jurisdiction of the General Court or regulated the manner in
which it should exercise its judicial power. Certain matters,
viz., the organization of the court, its jurisdiction, the times
and places of its sessions, the fees allowed to the judges and
the clerk, and the admission of attorneys, were fully regulated
by statute. Process was regulated to some extent. The rules of
pleading, practice, and evidence were regulated so little that
it seems safe to say that they continued as at common law except as modified by the General Court."200
In 1800, "for the purpose of establishing and maintaining an
uniformity in the practice of the several courts throughout the
territory," the Northwest Assembly enacted:
101 An act regarding evidence adopted in 1791 (1 CHASE 110; PEASE 44) was adopted
about a year after a similar act had been passed by Congress applicable to "every court
within the United States." Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122. An act regarding
pleading in person or by attorney published in 1792 (1 CHASE 126; PEASE 88) differed
somewhat from the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 92.
198 See "Legislative Agencies and Power" supra. For details of this arrangement,
see Blume, Legislation on the American Frontier, 60 MICH. L. REv. 317 (1962).
100 See 2 ST. CLAIR PAPERS 72, 73-74; 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 204, 206-07.
2-00 3 TM.NSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1814-1824,
xvii (Blume ed. 1938).
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"That it is hereby made the duty of the judges of the
general court, to compile a system of rules for the government of the general and circuit courts, and they are hereby
required, on or before the first Monday of August next, to
cause a copy of such rules to be delivered to the clerk of each
of the said courts. Provided always, That the said rules shall
be consistent with the constitution, laws and ordinances of the
United States and the acts of this territory; which rules may
be revised and amended by the said judges, when and as often
as occasion may require ...." 201
Here is clear indication of the legislators' belief that they had
power to regulate the proceedings of the court established by Congress and that any regulations made by the court must be consistent
with territorial statutes as well as with the Constitution and laws
of the United States.202 In Michigan the territorial supreme court
made extensive use of its rule-making power, but always recognized, seemingly, that rules of court must not conflict with statutory law.2os
After the congressional act of 1805 had conferred on the
superior courts some of the jurisdiction exercised by the federal
court of Kentucky district, the Michigan superior judges sat on
certain days "exclusively for the transaction of business as a circuit
and district court of the United States," and at these sessions undertook to follow rules of practice prescribed by Congress for the
courts of the United States.204 In Mississippi, Judge Rodney "was
convinced that his territorial supreme court was a district and
circuit court of the United States." 205 Judge Toulmin, on the
other hand, was "satisfied" that his separate superior court was
"merely a territorial court authorized like state courts to entertain
l CHASE 307.
A Mississippi statute enacted in 1805 provided that the supreme court should
have "power and authority to ordain and establish all necessary rules of practice for
the orderly conducting and managing of business in the said court and in the respective
circuit courts, as also in the offices of the respective clerks, and to appoint days for
taking rules in said offices: Provided such rules be not contrary to the ordinance and
laws for the government of this Territory." MISS. ACTS, 3d Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. § 9, at
55 (1805). Similar rule-making power was conferred on the supreme or superior courts
of all the territories involved in the present study with the possible exception of
Southwest.
203 See Rule-Making Power and its Exercise in 3 BLUME, op. cit. supra note 200, at
xi-xxxiii.
204 Id. at xxxiii-xxxv.
205 HAMILTON, ANGLO-AMERICAN LAw OF TIIE FRONTIER: THOMAS RODNEY &: His
TERRITORIAL CAsEs 95, 98 (1953).
201

202
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certain suits also belonging to the federal jurisdiction."206 Having
so held, he followed a local venue law in a case involving the
United States. Concerning the power of the local legislature to
regulate the business of the court established by Congress, Judge
Toulmin observed:
"Indeed the territorial judges have always been regarded
as much more subject to legislative controul, than this idea
would lead one to believe. Whether this assumption of power
on the part of the territorial legislature, has arisen from the
reason & nature of the. case, or from the clause in the ordinance which gives them the power of 'regulating and defining
the powers and duties of magistrates and other civil officers';
I know not:-but certain it is, that they have uniformly exercised this regulating controul. The ordinance provided
merely for one court:-the general assembly have made as
many courts as counties. The ordinance gave to the judges,
simply a 'common law' jurisdiction. The general assembly
have formed out of the same materials, courts of chancery."
A Digest of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the Territory
of Michigan published in 18212°7 contained divisions headed
"Equity" and "Admiralty." The latter, after directing "that
separate Minutes and Records be kept, by a separate clerk, of the
transactions of this Court, sitting as a Circuit and District Court
of the United States," provided that "Every Counsellor and Attorney, on the common law side, shall be, of course, a proctor on the
admiralty side of the Court; and the rules at the common law side,
when applicable, shall be observed on the admiralty side of the
Court." In 1827 the Michigan Legislative Council provided that
the supreme court of the territory should have jurisdiction "in
cases properly cognizable by a court of chancery, in which a plain,
adequate, and complete remedy cannot be had at law," and that
the proceedings in the court, where not regulated by the statutes
of the Territory, should be regulated "by the judges thereof, conforming to the rules and proceedings established by courts of
chancery in England, so far as the same shall be consistent with the
laws and Constitution of the United States, and the laws of the
Territory of Michigan." 208 Federal Equity Rule XXXIII of 1822
had provided:
206
201
208

6 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 516, 525.
Reprinted in 4 BLUME, op. cit. supra note 200, at 515-32.
2 MICHIGAN LAws 517.
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"In all cases where the rules prescribed by this court, or
by the circuit court, do not apply, the practice of the circuit
court shall be regulated by the practice of the high court of
chancery in England." 209
It is clear that the council assumed that the territorial court was not
governed by the federal rules, but should be governed by similar
rules adopted in the Territory.
In 1863, after the New York Code of Procedure (1848) had
been "enacted in substance, and often in its very letter" in many
of the territories,210 the Supreme Court of the United States in a
case coming up from Nebraska held that a territorial court sitting
in chancery was governed by the same statutes and court rules as
governed the federal courts.211 Three Justices dissented, impressed
by a contention that the territorial court was "not a court under
the Constitution, nor organized under the Judiciary Act of 1789,
but by the legislature of the Territory under the organic act." The
Nebraska code had been copied from Ohio but had retained a
formal distinction between law and equity. In a case coming up
from Montana, where procedural union of law and equity had
been provided, the Supreme Court of the United States held in
1871 that trial of a case of equitable jurisdiction could not be conducted with a jury as a trial at common law.212 Justice Bradley
observed:
"From the provisions of the organic law, which have been
referred to in the argument, it is apparent that the Territorial
legislature has no power to pass any law in contravention of
the Constitution of the United States, or which shall deprive
the Supreme and District Courts of the Territory of chancery
as well as common-law jurisdiction.
"This case was clearly a case of chancery jurisdiction, and
one necessarily requiring equitable, as distinguished from
legal, relief." 213
In Hornbuckle v. Toombs (1874), 214 also a Montana case, the only
errors assigned were "based on the intermingling of legal and equitable remedies in one form of action." After a careful review of the
200

20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) xxi (1822).

210 HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING §
211 Orchard v. Hughes, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 73 (1863).

212
213
2H

Dunphy v. Kleinsmith, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 610 (1871).
Id. at 614.
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 648 (1874).

84, at 88 (1897).
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whole subject the Court disapproved its previous decisions. Mr.
Justice Bradley stated:

"Now, here is nothing which declares, as the Process Act
of 1792 did declare, that the jurisdicti_ons of common law and
chancery shall be exercised separately, and by distinct forms
and modes of proceeding. The only provision is, that the
courts shall possess both jurisdictions. . . .
"A clause in the thirteenth section of the act, however,
has been referred to, by which it is declared 'that the Constitution, and all laws of the United States which are not locally
inapplicable, shall have the same force and effect within the
said Territory of Montana as elsewhere in the United States;'
and it is argued that by virtue of this enactment, all regulations respecting judicial proceedings which are contained in
any of the acts of Congress, are imported into the practice
of the Territorial courts. But this proposition is not tenable.
Laws regulating the proceedings of the United States courts
are of specific application, and are, in truth and in fact, locally
inapplicable to the courts of a Territory....
"It is true that the District Courts of the Territory are, by
the organic act, invested with the same jurisdiction, in all
cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, as is vested in the Circuit and District Courts of the
United States; and a portion of each term is directed to be
appropriated to the trial of causes arising under the said Constitution and laws. Whether, when acting in this capacity, the
said courts are to be governed by any of the regulations affecting the Circuit and District Courts of the United States, is not
now the question.... To avoid question and controversy as
to the modes of proceeding in such cases, where not already
settled by law, perhaps additional legislation would be desirable."215
In 1874 Congress declared "that it shall not be necessary in any of
the courts of the several Territories of the United States to exercise
separately the common-law and chancery jurisdictions vested in
said courts; and that the several codes and rules of practice adopted
in said Territories respectively, in so far as they authorize a mingling of said jurisdictions or a uniform course of proceeding in all
cases whether legal or equitable, be confirmed."216
215
216

Id. at 653-56.
Act of April 7, 1874, ch. 80, 18 Stat. 27.
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Whether, when sitting to try cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, territorial courts should follow
federal procedure-a question raised but left unanswered in H <Jrnbuckle v. Toombs-was involved in the Washington admiralty
case (1877) previously noted.
"What rules are to govern the exercise of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction by our courts? ...
"Our answer ... is, that the rules of admiralty, promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States as far as they
can be applied, are to regulate the procedure in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in the courts of this Territory."211
The several bankruptcy acts, referred to under "Bankruptcy"
above, prescribed the procedure to be followed. It seems clear that
all courts mentioned in the acts, including territorial, were to be
governed by the same procedural statutes and rules.
Regulations fixing the times and places of holding superior
courts were complicated by frontier conditions, and will be noted
briefly under "Influence of the Frontier" below.
INFLUENCE OF THE FRONTIER

After interviewing a number of lawyers at Cincinnati in December 1831, Alexis de Tocqueville, a French magistrate studying
American democracy, wrote:
"A defective English law (and there are many) is imported into America by the first emigrants. They modify it,
adapt it after a fashion to their social condition; but they still
retain for it a superstitious respect, and are unable to rid
themselves of it entirely. The second emigration takes place;
these same men plunge once again into the wilderness. This
time the law is modified in such a way that it has almost lost
the stamp of its origin. But it requires still a third emigration
before it ceases to exist."218
Referring to the first and second emigrations in more general terms
he added:
"The Europeans, on coming to America, left behind them,
217
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in large part, the traditions of the past, the institutions and
customs of their fatherland; they built a society which has
analogies with those of Europe, but which at bottom is radically different. In the last forty years, from the midst of that
new society has gone out another swarm of emigrants marching west, as once their fathers came to the coasts of New
England and Maryland. Like them, abandoning the ideas of
their fatherland together with the soil that bore them, they
are founding in the valleys of the Mississippi a new society."
Tocqueville had been told that there were already 5,000,000 inhabitants in the Mississippi valley, and his informant had predicted that within twenty years a major portion of the population
of the United States would be west of the Ohio. Law that had been
gradually adapted over a period of almost 200 years to the conditions of the Atlantic colonies and states was undergoing its second
major adaptation. The third emigration (out of the Mississippi
Valley to the West Coast) was not foreseen-only the consequences
of a third plunge into the wilderness.
From the information given him at Cincinnati, Tocqueville
was able to see in the second emigration a development of law equal
in importance to that which had taken place in the Atlantic colonies and states. Whether due to "the influence of the frontier" or
to "the loss of ancestral baggage while on the march," 2111 the law
of the Atlantic society, adapted from England, was being changed
to meet the conditions of the Mississippi Valley. If a third emigration should take place the stamp of English origin would be lost.
That his information as to what was occurring in the course of the
second emigration was correct may be assumed from the fact that
among the lawyers interviewed by him at Cincinnati were Justice
McLean of the United States Supreme Court; Bellamy Storer,
referred to as "the leading lawyer of Cincinnati"; and Salmon P.
Chase, later to be Chief Justice of the United States, and then engaged in editing the Statutes of Ohio and of the Northwest Territory.220
Ever since Professor Turner's paper on the "Significance of the
Frontier in American History" (1893), attempts have been made to
find in his "frontier theory" an explanation of the development of
American law. Legal as well as political "abuses" have been attributed to frontier thought and action.
219
220
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"In particular many crudities in judicial organization and
procedure are demonstrably legacies of the frontier. Moreover
the spirit of American law of the nineteenth century was sensibly f!.ffected by the spirit of the pioneer."221
This statement by Pound was not supported by a bill of particulars,
and a search for the frontier "crudities" which constitute our
"legacies" has thus far proved fruitless.
The Northwest Ordinance (1787) did not prescribe when or
where the supreme-general-superior court should hold its sessions,
leaving this to the court itself or to the territorial legislature made
up, at first, of the governor and judges. Assuming this power, the
legislative board in 1788 provided that the court "hold pleas, civil
and criminal, at four certain periods or terms, in each and every
year in such counties as the judges shall from time to time deem
most conducive to the general good." 222 By 1790, four counties had
been organized, and the court was required to hold a yearly session
in each county at specified times. 223 The size of the court's circuit
can be visualized by recalling that local courts for the four counties
were held at Marietta, Cincinnati, Vincennes, Cahokia, Prairie du
Rochers, and Kaskaskias. A proposal by judges Symmes and Turner that the holding of sessions of the court in the two western
counties be left to the discretion of the judges was rejected by
Acting Governor Sargent.224
"To go" their immense circuit in 1790, judges Symmes and
Turner purchased a boat which was later paid for out of the
national treasury. 225 It appears, however, that "the boat belonging
to the civil government" was taken by the military.226 After referring to the loss of the boat, Acting Governor Sargent reported to
the Secretary of War in December 1792:
"From this Cause the general Courts of Justice are not
yet known in the two western Counties and have held only a
single Term in Washington County which, with great reason,
is complained of by the people; the grand Inquest for the
body of the County of St. Clair have gone so far as formally to
221 Pound, The Pioneers and the Common Law, 27 W. VA. L.Q. I, 3-4 (1920). See
POUND, THE SPIRIT OF TIIE COMMON LAW 112-38 (1921).
222 See I CHASE 97; PEASE II.
223 See I CHASE 107; PEASE 35.
224 !! TERRITORIAL PAPERS 317.
225 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 42, § 7, I Stat. 286.
226 !! TERRITORIAL PAPERS 388.
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present this Grievance to me requesting that I should lay it
before the President"It would be impracticable Sir for the Judges to perform
the Circuits without Escortes and it is so very seldom they are
to be obtained that their Honours (when in the Territory)
are obliged to be in a manner stationary."227
Another reason why sessions of the supreme-general-superior
court were not regularly held was lack of a quorum. Often two,
and sometimes three, of the judges were absent from the territory
at a time. To meet this situation Congress provided in 1792228 that
any one of the "supreme or superior" judges "in the absence of the
other judges" might hold a court. Commenting on this provision
in 1794 Governor St. Clair wrote the Secretary of State:
"Many representations, Sir, have been made to me on this
Subject-the people, very generally, think it an unsafe Situation which they are in; and indeed, taking the matter abstractly, it cannot be thought very eligible, that the whole
property of the Country which may [be] the subject of legal
dispute, should be governed by the determination of a single
Judge, without the possibility of having that determination
revised.' ' 229
In an attempt to meet the needs of the western counties, the
governor and judges of Northwest adopted in 1795 a law providing
that issues formed in the General Court be tried in the county
"whence the cause was removed" by the superior judges "or any
one of them" who were directed "if occasion require, to go on circuit, twice in every year, into the counties of St. Clair and Knox." 230
The judges were authorized to do whatever necessary for the trial
of any issue "as fully as justices of nisi prius in any of the United
States may or can do." 231 While the three judges were in session at
Cincinnati in 1798, Acting Governor Sargent urged upon them the
great need for holding a circuit court in one of the western counties, suggesting that one of the judges "should depart without more
Delay for the Mississippi," concluding: "If there should be any
Id. at 389.
Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 42, § 4, 1 Stat. 286.
229 See note 153 supra.
230 See 1 CHAsE 149; PEASE 157.
231 For a detailed account of the Northwest nisi prius system, see Blume, Circuit
Courts and the Nisi Prius System: The Making of an Appellate Court, 38 MICH. L.
R.Ev. 289, 295-304 (1940).
221
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Doubt of the powers of a single Judge to hold a Court such may
be readily established in our legislative Capacity."232 A nisi prius
judge merely presided over the trial of a case commenced in the
central court, reporting the results to the central court where
judgment was rendered, and it may be that Sargent distinguished
nisi prius trials from sessions of the General Court which could be
held by one judge only in the absence of the other judges.
Whether due to lack of means of transportation, lack of military escort, absence of judges, doubts as to the power or ability of
one judge to hold a court, or to absorption in other interests, the
circuit courts were never held as scheduled. This was an "abuse"
and the cause of much complaint. In explanation a congressional
committee reported in 1800 that
" ... most of the evils which they at present experience are in
the opinion of this committee, to be imputed to the very great
extent of country at present comprised under their imperfect
Government. The Territory northwest of the Ohio from
southeast to northwest [is] fifteen hundred miles, and the actual distance of travelling from the places of holding courts
the most remote from each other is thirteen hundred miles .
. . . In the three western counties there has been but one court
having cognizance of crimes in five years. . . . The extreme
necessity of judiciary attention and assistance is experienced
in civil as well as criminal cases." 233
The committee recommended that the territory be "divided into
two distinct and separate Governments, by a line beginning at
the mouth of the Great Miami." Following this recommendation
Congress created a new territory in the west-Indiana-leaving
the Northwest government to function in the east. In 1803 the
southern part of eastern territory became a state, the northern part
being added to Indiana. Inhabitants of the northern part in a petition to Congress dated at Detroit, March 20, 1803, complained:
"Experience has already taught us the ruinous consequences which a procrastination in judicial proceedings, produces to Commerce; for a term of more than Six Years, whilst
under the Government of the North Western Territory, but
Two Superior-Courts were held in the County of Wayne;
notwithstanding the many Actions removed into the General
.232
233

3
1

TERRITORIAL PAPERS 503, 504.
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Court by error &ca-Several of which will remain undecided,
altho' pending Three or Four years. The ostensible causes
which operated to deprive us of regular and stated courts,
whilst a part of the late Territory, must necessarily increase,
as long as we remain attached to the Indiana, in a ratio, proportionate to the increase of distance, added to the greater
hazard, the Judges must encounter in performing a Journey
of at least double the distance the late Judges had to travel,
and the whole of that immense distance, thro' a continued
Indian Country, inhabited by distinct Nations and Tribes of
Savages, often at War amonst themselves, as well as hostile
to travellers." 234
The Northwest nisi prius system was continued in Indiana
by a law adopted in 1801 providing that upon any issue joined in
the General Court, the issue should be tried in the county whence
the cause was removed before the judges of the General Court, "or
any one of them," as a circuit court.235 In 1807 the system was
modified by a provision that the circuit court should render final
judgment, and issue execution, subject to review by the General
Court.236 These provisions, and a further provision empowering
the superior judge on circuit "to grant and order new trials,"
changed the system from nisi prius to one-judge courts.
As the frontier line of continuous settlement moved westward,
and new territorial governments were established, the Northwest
difficulties were encountered over and over again. Local courts
held by lay judges were unsatisfactory; but how could three superior judges sit in bank at all the times and places desired?
One answer was to provide for "additional" judges; another was
to authorize one superior judge to hold court alone, subject to
review by the judges in bank. In Mississippi under a law passed
in 1805, one judge could hold a superior "circuit court" subject
to review by the three superior judges, or two of them, sitting
as the "Supreme Court of Mississippi Territory." 237 In 1804 Congress provided for the appointment of an "additional" superior
judge who was to reside "at or near the Tombigbee settlement."238
234 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EREcnoN OF WAYNE COUNTY
TERRITORY 14 (1922-1923).
235 INDIANA LAws 8.
236 Id. at 230.
237 Miss. Acts, 3d Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. 55 (1805). See note 58 supra.
238 Act of March 27, 1804, ch. 59, 2 Stat. 301.
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A second "additional" judge was authorized in 1810,239 the act
providing that judgments and decrees of the "additional" judges
might be reviewed by the "superior court" of Adams County "composed of not less than two judges." Judge Toulmin summarized
the developments in an opinion delivered in 1815:
"Originally there were only three judges for the Mississippi Territory, who by the ordinance constituted a court, possessing common law jurisdiction. In the year 1802 the territorial legislature divided the territory into certain districts,
in each of which a superior court was to be held by the judges
appointed under the ordinance:-but writs of error lay to
each of those superior courts, from the superior court of
Adams district. That part of the territory which lay east of
Pearl river, and which was called the district of Washington,
being very inconvenient to judges residing on the Mississippi;
an additional judge for the territory was appointed under an
act of congress passed in 1804:-and although, like the preceding ones, he was a judge for the territory at large;-it was
made his especial duty to reside at or near the Tombigby
settlement,-and he was vested exclusively of the other
judges, with the same jurisdiction as had antecedently been
exercised by them within the district of Washington." 240

An "additional" judge for Missouri (1814) was required to reside
at or near the "village of Arkansaw." 241 Doty, "additional" judge
for Michigan, wrote in 1830:
"On the 30th, of January 1823, an act was passed to provide for the appointment of an Additional Judge for the
Michigan territory in the Counties of Mackinaw, Brown and
Crawford, which embraced the whole country situated between Lakes Huron, Superior and Michigan, and the Mississippi river. He was required to hold terms of the court at
three places-the Island of Michilimackinaw, Green Bay and
Prairie du Chien. His jurisdiction was that of the Supreme
and County Courts, and his salary fixed at $1200. per annum.
In performing his duties he travels thirteen hundred and
sixty miles by water, and usually in a birch-bark canoe."242
239

Act of March 2, 1810, ch. 16, § 2, 2 Stat. 564.
516, 517.
Act of Jan. 27, 1914, ch. 8, 3 Stat. 95.
12 T.ERIUTORIAL P .APERS 140.
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The situation east of Lake Michigan was described by Judge
Woodbridge in 1828:
"Heretofore, & until recently, the Judges of this Territory were required to hold but one Term of the Court annually & that in Detroit. . . . But as the country became
more settled, new counties were organized;- and it has been
deemed expedient to increase the number of terms, & places
too, of holding Courts.-The Legislative Council of the Territory, under the sanction of an Act of Congress of the 29th
J anY 1827, have, at its late session, directed court to be holden
in each of the organized counties of the Peninsula-& giving
very ample jurisdiction to them, have required that all or a
majority of the Judges attend each term.-The consequence
of this new organization is, that the Judges, collectively, have
now to hold fifteen Courts annually, instead of one, & to traverse, mostly on horseback, an immense country, over roads
not yet half formed &, some of which are exceedingly dangerous.-The principle of this system, is progressive; the
number of courts to be holden, will continue to increase with
the advancing settlement of the Country."243

As long as the superior judges of Michigan controlled the legislative board, the Supreme Court sat only at Detroit. A change
of the legislative agency was necessary to correct this "abuse." 2H
In a memorial to Congress presented in 1814, the Legislature
of Indiana suggested the "propriety and necessity of defining, with
more precision, the duties of the judges appointed by virtue of
243 Letter, Woodbridge to Strong, dated Nov. 28, 1828, Woodbridge Papers, Burton
Historical Collection, Public Library, Detroit, Michigan.
244 Objections were made to trial in Wayne County of indictments for murders
alleged to have been committed in other counties-some of them far distant from
Detroit. Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases: Constitutional Vicinage and
Venue, 43 MICH. L. R.Ev. 59, 82 (1944). That this practice may have been desirable
in a frontier territory is suggested by a Virginia statute enacted 1655-1666: "WHEREAS
there was an act for the benefitt and ease of the people that criminal causes should be
tryed in the counteys where the offenders committed them. ·wee conceive it no ease nor
benefitt to the people to have their lives taken away with too much ease, And though
we confesse the same to be done in England, yet wee know the disparity between them
and vs to be so great that wee cannot with safety follow the example, for noe country
there but makes at least ten times the number of people here, and the jurors there are
more practised in criminal! causes then, by the blessing of God, wee are here, and
have more to informe them in case they should err, And 'tis a maxim that no
deliberation can be too much pondered that concerns the life of the meanest man; Be it
therefore enacted, that from henceforth all criminall causes that concerne life or member
be tryed at quarter courts before the Governour and Councill or at Assemblies (which
of them shall first happen,) where it is probable the ablest and most impartiall men will
meet." 1 HENNING, STATUTES AT LARGE 397 (1823).
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the ordinance for the government of the Territory . . . as the
ordinance creating the courts leaves it afloat, without identifying
either the time when, the place where, or the manner how, this
court is to exercise their jurisdiction."2 • 11 The memorial detailed
some of the difficulties which had arisen under the act of Congress authorizing one judge to hold a court,246 and prayed that
the act be repealed. In response Congress enacted in 1815:
"That the judges of the general court of the Indiana territory, shall, in each and every year, hold two sessions of the
said court, at Vincennes, in the county of Knox, on the first
Mondays of February and September; at Corydon, in the
county of Harrison, on the third Mondays in February and
September; and at Brookville, in the county of Franklin, on
the first Mondays next succeeding the fourth Mondays of
February and September, which courts respectively shall be
composed of at least two of the judges appointed by the government of the United States; and no person or persons,
acting under the authority and appointment of the said territory, shall be associated with the said judges."247
A week after Congress had settled the matter of court sessions
for Indiana, a different scheme was provided for Illinois. The
Territory was divided into three circuits, and each judge directed
to hold court alone in the circuit allotted to him, at the times
and places fixed by the statute.248 The judges in bank were to
ANNALS OF CONG., 13th Cong., 3d Sess. 400 (1814).
"Thus, one of the judges being competent to hold a court, may decide a principle,
or a point of law, at one term, and, at the next term, if the other two judges are present,
they may decide the same principle or point of law different. Thus the decisions of
the superior court, organized, we presume, by the General Government, finally to settle
in uniformity the principles of law and fact, which may be brought before them by the
suitor, may be, and frequently are, in a state of fluctuation; hence the rights of persons
and property become insecure. There is another evil, growing out of the system, of one
judge being competent to hold the superior court, or that court which forms the last
resort of the suitor in any Government, and particularly in the Territory; for appeals
are taken from all the court of inferior jurisdiction in the Territory, to the court
organized by the ordinance, which inferior courts are never constituted of less than two
judges. Thus the suitor in the Territory is frequently driven to the necessity of
appealing from the judgment of two men to that of one; but this dilemma only
constitutes part of the solecism for the next superior court, as the other two judges may
overturn the principles of the decision of their brother judge at the preceding term.
Hence the want of uniformity in the decisions of the court of the last resort. Anger
and warmth in the suitors, and confusion in our system of jurisprudence, is the result."
Ibid.
247 Act of Feb. 24, 1815, ch. 54, 3 Stat. 213.
248 Act of March 3, 1815, ch. 237, §§ 2, 3, 3 Stat. 237.
2411
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constitute a court of appeals. This scheme had been adopted by
the local legislature in 1814,249 but had not become operative because of opposition by the judges. In a memorial to Congress
dated December 21, 1814,250 the legislature, after referring to its
conflict with the judges, stated:
"The vast accumulation of expenses and the personal inconvenience that would result to the people of remote and
distant parts of the Territory by obliging them all with their
witnesses to attend at Kaskaskia for the trial of their causes,
if they ;would not, in many instances amount to a total denial
of Justice, they would at least be extremely oppressive-And
the single circumstance of their having been but one suit instituted in the court of which their honors are Judges for the
last two years, demonstrates most conclusively that some
change was necessary.
"The law herewith transmitted was planned with a view
to former objections that were understood to have been made
by the Judges, by which it appeared that they would not
object to performing their duties of a separate Court, provided the style, and unity of their Court was nominally
preserved. " 251
Whatever may have been their real reasons for opposing the court
scheme of 1814, the judges were probably sincere in their desire
to preserve the "style and unity" of their court. Though unity
was not preserved as it would have been by a nisi prius system,
the fact the judges assigned themselves to their individual circuits,
and met together to review their respective judgments, made possible a degree of unity that was more than nominal.
· This scheme of court organization, supplemented in 1836 by
the addition of probate and justices' courts, became the standardized or established system referred to above under "Judicial Systems after 1836." The difficulties and dangers of frontier travel
had forced both Congress and the local legislatures to abandon
ancient traditions and to seek something new.
The chief problems remaining were to determine who should
divide the territories into districts, assign individual judges to the
249
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Id. at 51.
Details of this and other Illinois developments with charts of court systems will
be found in Schuyler, The Judicial System in the Illinois Territory (1809-1818),
Jan. 1962 (unpublished thesis in University of Michigan Law Library).
250
251
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several districts, and fix the number, time, and place of sessions.
That no one solution of these problems was found is indicated
by the following digest of sections 1913-1918 of the Revised Statutes, 1873-74:
Power to divide territory into districts
Legislature- N.M., Utah, Wash., Colo., Dakota, Ariz.,
Wyo.
Judges - Idaho, Mont.
Power to assign individual judges to district
Legislature-N.M., Wash., Colo., Dakota, Ariz., Wyo.
Judges - Idaho, Mont.
Governor - Utah.
Power to fix number, time, and place of sessions
Legislature -Wash., Colo., Dakota, Wyo.
Judges - Idaho, Mont., N.M., Ariz.
Governor - Utah.
An undated brochure recently circulated by the American
Judicature Society contains views of Arthur T. Vanderbilt and
Roscoe Pound on "Modern Unified Court Organizations." After
pointing out that "multiplicity of courts" is characteristic of "an
immature system of law," Vanderbilt states that "all the courts
that any American state really needs" are three: 1. A general
trial court with state-wide jurisdiction of every kind of case. 2. A
local court for the trial of minor cases. 3. An appellate tribunal
to review questions of law. Noting that very few of our states
have achieved "this ideal of the three-court system," Vanderbilt
observes that "the degree to which they have progressed in this
direction is one measure of their judicial civilization." Pound
proposes that the whole judicial power of the state be "concentrated in one court" made up of "three chief branches" corresponding to the "three courts" recommended by Vanderbilt. He suggests that the "one court" might be called "The Court of Justice"
(another name suggested, "The General Court of Justice"). Vanderbilt believes intermediate courts of appeal must be provided
as needed in the larger states. Pound, on the other hand, thinks
"it should be possible for the supreme court to sit in divisions if
necessary for the prompt dispatch of business." Regional or local
appellate terms of the superior court should be provided making
unnecessary "intermediate appellate tribunals of any sort."

"As has been suggested in other connections, the proce-
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dure at these terms could be as simple as at the old hearings
in bank at Westminster after a trial at circuit. Three judges
assigned to hold the term would pass on a motion for a new
trial or judgment on or notwithstanding a verdict, or for
modification or setting aside of findings and judgment accordingly (as at common law upon a special verdict). If, as
I assume would be true, it proved necessary to limit the cases
which could go thence to the supreme court, rules could restrict review to those taken by the highest court on certiorari. " 252
It has been said the organization of the judicial system in the
territories 1861-1890 was "simple."
"Under the organic acts, each territory had three justices
appointed by the president for four-year terms. Sitting together, they constituted a supreme court; sitting separately,
they acted as district judges. In both capacities they had
jurisdiction over cases arising under United States or territorial law; appeals went from the territorial supreme court
to the Supreme Court of the United States." 253
Only two types of inferior courts were authorized: (1) justices'
courts; (2) probate courts. The organization of these courts was
left to local legislation, but with express limitations on the jurisdiction of the justices' courts and an implied limitation on the
jurisdiction of the probate courts.
In one respect, progress toward "judicial civilization" went
beyond the "ideal" system outlined in the Judicature Society's
brochure. By employing separate sessions it was found practicable to concentrate in one set of superior courts both state and
federal jurisdiction.
Comparison of the standardized or established territorial court
system after 1836 with that provided for Northwest commencing
in 1787 will indicate the principal developments of the period of
experimentation:
1. The court system of Northwest consisted of a supremegeneral-superior court, superior circuit courts, courts of oyer and
terminer, courts of common pleas, courts of quarter sessions, probate judges, probate courts, orphans courts, and courts of justices
252 Undated brochure of American Judicature Society.
253 POMEROY, THE TERRITORIES AND TiiE UNITED STATES 1861-1890-STtJDIES IN COLONIAL
ADMINISTRATION 51 (1947).
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of the peace. In the later system there were only four types of
courts-supreme, superior, probate, and justice.
2. The supreme-general-superior court of Northwest had both
original and appellate jurisdiction. The supreme court of the
later system was an appellate court with little or no original
jurisdiction.
3. The circuit system of Northwest was a true nisi prius system under which all questions of law were decided by the judges
sitting in bank on demurrer or motion. Under the later system
judgments rendered on circuit by the individual judges were reviewed by the judges in bank on writ of error or equity appeal.
4. All Northwest trial courts, except perhaps the nisi prius
courts, were multiple-judge courts. The trial courts of the later
system were held by single judges.
5. The Northwest superior courts had a common-law jurisdiction only. The later superior courts had a chancery as well as
a common-law jurisdiction.
6. The Northwest courts had no federal-type jurisdiction, did
not follow federal procedure, and there was no review by a federal appellate court. The courts of the later system had both state
and federal jurisdiction, followed federal procedure to a limited
extent, and were subject to federal review.
7. The superior judges of Northwest were appointed by the
national government to serve during good behavior. The superior
judges of the later system were appointed in like manner for
four-year terms.
8. The inferior judicial officers of Northwest were appointed
by the governor. Those of the later system might be elected.
The governor and judges of Northwest were supposed to legislate by adopting laws from the original states, and it is evident
that Northwest's multiple-court, multiple-judge judicial system
was pieced together by selecting features of the older systems. The
streamlined system of the later period was the product of what
may be called an ideal course of development-from the complex
to the simple. This course of development was forced by the
steady pressure of frontier conditions. Lack of local persons competent to serve as judges of local multiple-judge courts made it
necessary to send competent superior judges to the scattered communities.21S4 The difficulties and dangers of frontier travel made
25¾

Acting Governor Sargent of Northwest noted in the Executive Journal that
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it impracticable to send benches of superior judges with satisfactory frequency, or at all, and this led to the establishment of districts in which on,e superior judge would reside, and go on circuit.
Meetings of the superior judges to hear demurrers and motions
and to render judgment under a nisi prius system required more
travel than a system of review by writ of error and equity appeal.
Impeachment of territorial judges was considered impracticable
because of the necessity of having witnesses travel great distances
to the seat of the national government. Appointment for short
terms, instead of during good behavior, was a partial solution of
the removal problem. Election, instead of appointment, of inferior judges was authorized in the period of Jacksonian Democracy and may be attributed to views current at the time.
After the territorial court system had been simplified, there
was a movement to unify and simplify superior court procedure.
Following the lead of New York, procedure codes were enacted in
Minnesota 1851, Oregon 1854, Washington 1854, Nebraska 1855,
Kansas 1859, Nevada 1861, Dakota 1862, Idaho 1864, Montana
1865, Wyoming 1869, Utah 1870, Oklahoma 1890, New Mexico
1897.255 Most of these codes "enacted in substance, and often in
its very letter," the New York Code of 1848.256 Of the territories
having the standardized or established judicial system after 1848
only Colorado failed to join the "procession of the codes." 257 In
Nebraska, "as in some' other territorial codes, a formal distinction
between law and equity was retained." 258
difficulty in finding suitable persons for appointment to office in the new county of
Wayne had forced him to appoint one person to more than one office. 3 TERRITORIAL
PAPERS 454. In a letter to the Secretary of State he wrote: "Sir my Difficulties have been
very great in selecting suitable Characters to Fill the civil Offices in this County-more
particularly for the Court of Common Pleas .••• It will however be extremely to be
lamented that so very few men of legal Ability or even common Education were to be
found in the County.'' Id. at 457. In Indiana the four county courts (common pleas,
quarter session, probate and orphans) inherited from Northwest were consolidated into
one court of common pleas in 1805. INDIANA LAws 115. It was obviously easier to staff
one local court than it was to find suitable judges for multiple local courts.
255 HEPBURN, op. cit. supra note
256 Id. at 88.
257 Id. at 112.
258 Id. at 102. In the Minnesota

210, at 98-111.

code of 1851 "a distinct jurisdiction 'in all matters
of chancery' was retained •..• In 1853, the court of chancery was abolished, and the
suits and proceedings in equity were brought within the provisions of the codes, as
'civil actions.'" Id. at 98. "In 1854 the New York code, in so far as it related to actions
at law, was adopted, word for word, by the fifth legislative assembly of Oregon. A
separate act was passed to regulate proceedings in equity.'' Id. at 101. Beardsley, Code
Making in Early Oregon, 27 PACIFIC NORTHWEST Q. 20 (No. 1, reprint 1936), quotes one
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The first constitutions of the seventeen states formed from the
territories having the standardized or established judicial system
provide court systems which are strikingly similar. This, bf
course, is because all the states were building on the same territorial base. In making the following summary, reference was made
to the Kansas Constitution of 1859:
Judicial power vested in
Supreme Court (appellate): Iowa, Wis., Minn., Ore., Kan.,
of the code commissioners as saying: "Mr. Bigelow strongly insisted upon having no
separate court of equity or equity proceedings, but urged that we follow the example
of California in this respect. Mr. Boise and I differed from Mr. Bigelow. We contended
that in the Organic Act of Aug. 14, 1848, a separate system of equity proceedings was
contemplated, wherin it provided that 'each district court, or judge thereof shall appoint
its clerk, who shall be the register in chancery.'" In Compiling the Territorial Codes
of Washington, 28 PACIFIC NORTHWEST Q. 19 (No. I, reprint 1937), Beardsley writes:
"Common to each of the territorial codes of "\Alashington from 1854 to 1869 inclusive,
was a provision which abolished all distinctions between 'actions at law' and 'suits in
chancery' and provided one form of action to be known as a 'civil action.' Such a statute
had been incorporated into the laws of several of the territories created by Congress
in the years between 1845 and 1865, and represented a liberal interpretation of that
section of their organic acts which provided that 'The supreme court and the district
courts, respectively, of every territory, shall possess chancery as well as common law
jurisdiction.' These territorial legislatures construed this grant of power to mean that
chancery and common law jurisdiction could be exercised jointly rather than severally.
It will be recalled that under a similar section in the Organic Act of Oregon Territory
the code commissioners of 1853 refused to make such an interpretation, notwithstanding
the urgent plea of Commissioner Daniel R. Bigelow of Olympia, who wished then to
combine equitable and legal relief in one proceeding. When this legislative power came
before the United States Supreme Court for review in a case arising in Montana, the
court held that the territorial legislature had no power to pass an act depriving the
territorial courts 'of chancery as well as common law jurisdiction.' This decision was
rendered on May I, 1871 . . . . As a result of this decision, the next session of the
legislative assembly on Washington Territory, which convened on October 2, 1871, was
forced to amend the code of civil procedure by enacting that, 'All common law forms
of action are hereby abolished, but the distinction between actions at law and suits in
chancery shall be preserved; . . .' One of the first matters to be considered by the
Legislative Assembly of 1873 which convened on October 6, was the question of the
revisions of the laws of the territory and particularly the Amendments of 1871 •••.
When the legislative session was over the people found that the practice codes as
embodied in the Code of 1873 were almost verbatim re-enactments of the similar codes
in the Code of 1869. This restored to the code of civil procedure the provision which
had abolished the distinction between actions at law and suits in chancery, and which
had substituted in place of these two forms of action-a civil action. In repealing the
Amendments of 1871, apparently the legislature had some knowledge of the principles
involved in the case of Hornbuckle v. Toombs-a second attempt made by the Montana
Territorial Legislature to establish its power to provide for a 'single form of action'which was then pending before the United States Supreme Court . . • . Five months
were to elapse before the decision of the court in the appeal of Hornbuckle v. Toombs
was to be handed down. During this interval a bill had been introduced into Congress,
on February 4, 1874, with the purpose of authorizing territorial legislative sanction of
the principle of the 'single form of action.' " For references to this bill, and to the
cases mentioned by Beardsley, see notes 212, 214, and 216 supra.
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Nev., Neb., Colo., Idaho, Mont., N.D., S.D., Wash.,
Wyo., Utah, Okla., N.M.
Superior trial courts
District: Iowa, Minn., Kan., Nev., Neb., Colo., Idaho,
Mont., N.D., Wyo., Utah, Okla., N.M.
Circuit: Wis., Ore., S.D.
Superior: Wash.
Probate courts: Wis., Minn., Kan., Neb., Idaho, N.M.
County courts (including probate): Ore., Colo., N.D., S.D.,
Wash., Okla.
Justices of the peace: All the above states except Iowa and
Ore.
Inferior courts established by legislature:
All the above states.
Supreme Court held by appellate judges
Elected from state at large: Iowa, Minn., Kan., Nev., Neb.,
Colo., Idaho, Mont., N.D., Wash., Wyo., Utah, N.M.
Elected from specified districts: S.D., Okla.
Supreme Court held by circuit judges: Wis., Ore.
Superior trial courts held by one locally elected judge:
Iowa, Wis., Minn., Ore., Kan., Nev., Colo., Idaho, Mont.,
N.D., S.D., Wyo., Utah, Okla., N.M., Wash.
Superior trial courts held by one justice of Supreme Court:
Neb.
Legislative divorce prohibited: All the above states.
In two of the three constitutions retaining the scheme of having
the same judges sit as trial and appellate judges, provision was
made for a change to the separate-judge system. In some of the
constitutions professional training was made a qualification for
judicial office.
In the change from the territorial court system to the state
systems the unique union of state and federal jurisdiction could
not be continued, and new means of selecting and removing superior judges had to be found. In the Wisconsin Constitutional
Convention of 1846 the question most debated was retention of
the partially-unified system under which superior judges tried cases
on circuit and sat together as a court of review. 259 Territorial experience was referred to in support of arguments for and against
the system. Another matter debated at length was whether su259 QUAIFE, THE CONVENTION OF

1846, at 286-87, 495-99, 501-06 (1918).
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perior judges should be elected or appointed, and for how long.260
Whether separate probate courts should be retained was debated
in the Constitutional Convention of 1847-48.261
The chief argument in favor of retaining the partially-unified
system was a strong belief that appellate judges wholly divorced
from trial work would become mere "parchment" judges, and
would rust out. They would lose touch with juries, and not know
what the people were thinking. The people would not know
them. Furthermore, they would be expensive and idle most of
the time. In the combined system young men could be used who
would gain through trial work the experience needed for appellate work. Their appellate experience would aid them in their
trial work. Older men with the trial experience necessary for
appellate work only would not be available. One argument against
retaining the partially-unified system was the practical one of foreseeing a time when growth of population would make the dual
role too burdensome. The chief argument, however, was not based
on predictions of what might happen, but on past experience.
There had been strong suspicions, if not positive proof, of judicial
"log rolling." These suspicions were not limited to Wisconsin.
In a study of colonial administration, Pomeroy states:
"The number of judges in a territory significantly affected
the development of the higher and still more of the lower
territorial judiciary. No increases above the usual three come
until after 1879; during the eighties Dakota reached as many
as eight judges, and Washington, Montana, Utah, and New
Mexico totals of five each. These additions made it possible
to provide, after 1884, that no judge of the territories affected
should sit in appeal in cases he had decided in district court.
This limitation was a gesture to an old grievance. Where a
judge had to review his own decisions, there was necessarily
'suspicion of collusion among the judges to sustain the opinions of each other in the courts below.' Charges of log-rolling
were such that the Supreme Court of Arizona was referred
to as the 'Supreme Court of Affirmance.' 'Unless there is some
change,' wrote a Montana attorney, 'it would be better .
to simply have mining or Justices courts.' " 262
260

Id. at 287-91, 587-89, 591-603.

201 JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION TO FORM A CONSTlTUTION FOR
WISCONSIN 370-75 (1848).
262 POMEROY, TIIE TERRITORIES AND THE UNITED STATES 1861-1890,
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Territorial judges of the standardized or established system
had been appointed by the President of the United States with the
consent of the Senate. This method of selection no longer available, what should take its place? The three most obvious substitutes were: appointment by the governor with the consent of the
state senate; appointment or election by the state legislature; election by the people. Statehood meant freedom from colonial rule,
and there was no more inclination to have strong state governors in
states formed from territories than there had been in states formed
from the original colonies. Jacksonian Democracy may be praised
or condemned for the decision to elect all judges by popular vote.
Though at one time territorial judges were appointed to serve
during good behavior, those of the later system were appointed
for four-year terms. Similar terms were provided for the elected
judges of the states.
The territorial probate courts were specialized courts. Whether
they should be retained or changed to county courts with enlarged
jurisdiction was much debated. As shown by the above digest,
the first constitutions of the states referred to divided equally on
this question.
In the development of our third judicial system, and in it~
transmission to the newly-formed states, there was increasing neglect of one of the two functions of appellate review as set out in
the congressional report of 1803. Under the nisi prius system both
functions (uniformity of decision and correctness of decision) were
served without favoring one as against the other. Under the circuit
system emphasis was put on the function of settling the law. But
as long as the same persons served as both trial and appellate
judges, interest in seeing that justice had been done in particular
cases was not lost. When the appellate courts began to be staffed
with separate judges, the function of unifying and settling the
law became the favored one; the other, an unwelcome chore. To
restore the neglected function to its original vigor, power to review for this purpose should be vested in benches of trial judges
to be exercised, as Pound recommends, in the original nisi prius
manner.
Continuing, Pomeroy gives other instances of popular discontent, concluding: "The
judicial system was one of the weakest parts of the territorial institution." Id. at 61.
He refers to the fact that "territorial judges were selected with no more deference to
local feeling than territorial governors and secretaries." Ibid. Persons chafing under
a tight colonial system, however well designed, are prone to find fault.

